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John Henry Newman was born in London on February 21, 1801. He was 
.. 
brought up in a sort of bible religion of the type common in England at that 
time. In 1808 he was sent to a private school in Ealing. Aa a youth he 
read Tom Paine's tracts ag~inst the Old Test~ent, some ot Hume's eseays, 
1 
and some French verses denying the immortality ot the soul. Such reading 
however did not influence the yr)Ung Newman as deeply a8 did hie reading of 
evan,gel1cal writers such as l;¥illiam Romaine (1714-1795) and Thomas Scott 
(174l-l82l). In the Aeologia Neh~an aaya that he practically owee hie 
soul, humanly speaking, to Thomas :')cott.2 ';'ihi1e at Ealing Newman exper-
lenced a religlnus conversion which WAS not merely emotional but involved 
intellectual convictions. Newman in his autobiographical memoir say. that 
one of the teachers at Eal1ng, Reverend vislter Mayer, gav, him "deep 
religioue impreSSions, at the time Calvinistic in character, which were to 
him the beginning ot a new life."; 
t Cf. John Henry Newman Apologia]£g ~~, London, Oxford 
edi tion, 1913, 107. Thh book wll1 be referrf~d to as Aeo1ogi. in these notes. 
2 ll!!., 108. 
; Letters ~ Correspondence ~ ~ Henri Newman. ed. by Anne Mozley, 
London, 1891. I, 27. 
1 
2. 
I\tter eight and a halt' years at ;:;aling, Newman left tor Trinity College 
at Oxford. At Oxford 1n 1822 he won an Oriel Fellowship. Wilfrid Ward 4 
pOints out that this was the turning point in Newman's lite. Newman himself 
says this of the Oriel Fellowship: 
It opened upon him a theologIcal career, placing him upon the high 
and broad platform of University society and intelligence, and bring-
ing him across those various influences, personal and intellectual, 
and the teaching of thoae various schools of ecclesiastical thought, 
whereby the religious sentiment in his mind ••• was gradually . 
deve loped and formed and brought on to its legitimate ieeues. 5 
The men of Oriel, such as Whately, Hawkins, and Blanco Jhlte, influenced 
Newman much, even though he reacted against their religious liberalism and 
rationalism. Of' 'whately, Newman says, "He, emphatically, opened my mind, 
and taught me to think and to use my reason. II 6 From the Oriel Fellows, 
Newman learned religious toleratton and the need for definiteness 1n 
religious matters as opposed to the vagueness of the evangelicals. The 
Oriel Fellows, however, placed too much emph~sis on reasoning in theology, 
and because of thi a tact they later were known as the Noetic •• 
In 1824 and l82~ Newman received Orders in the Church of England, and 
became a curate at :3t. Clement'. Church, Oxford. In 1828 he WaB appointed. 
4 Wiltrid Ward, .D!!. !4!!. .2!. ~ Henry Newman, London, 
1921, I, ~. 
~ Mozley, Letters, I, 7~: Newman wrote this memoir u8ing pronouns 
or the third person to refer to himself. 
6 Apologia, 114. 
lVicar of't. )ijary1a. In this year Newman became a I'llore intimate friend of 
Iurrell Froude. Through Froude, he also became friendly with John Keble. 
~ese friendships were extremely important in Newman's development. Also 
in 1828 Newman began to read systematically the Fathers of the ::':hurch. They 
were a great influence on his philoeophiciii1 and thf301ogical thcmght, espec-
ially in regard to the nature 01: the universe and the nature of t.he Church. 
Later in life Newman said, nThe Fathers made me a Catholic. n7 
In 18;52 Newman traveled about the Mediterranean. 1tihile in Sicily he 
contracted a rever which brought him near death. Despite the severity of hie 
~ever he believed that he would not die, and he also believed that God had 
some special work for him to do. 8 When Bewman returned to England in July 
of IS" he found hie work. The disestablishment of the Church of England 
seemed imminent; ten Iri8h bishoprics had been suppressed. Froude, Keble 
and Palmer had already pledged themselves to write and associate in defense 
of the Church, I'lnd Newman joined them wholeheartedly. On July 14, 18;;, 
Keble preached his famouB sermon "The National Aposta8~" about England's 
desire to toresake the Church. In September of 18" the "Tracts for the 
Times" began to be published, and the Oxford or Tractarian Movement wae well 
on its way. Thie If:OVement waB against diee.tabUahment, but 1t was more 
fundamentally a call to holinesl, and to a return to the primitive and 
apostolic Christianity, and to dogma and scientific theology. 
7 Newman, Lectures ~ Certain Difficulties Felt ~ Anglicans, II, 24, 
as quoted in Harrold, ~ Henry Newman, London, i945, 18. 
a Of. Apologia, 1,5. 
4. 
Newman gained eminence at Oxford through bis leadership of the Oxford 
Movement end through his tracts and sermons. In 18'9 however he began to 
doubt the validity of the Church of England! his study of the l<~onophyaite8, 
and an article by \{iseman on the Donathts were the immediate causes of his 
doubts. Newman SaW the similarity of the Church of England to the schisms 
9 
of the MonophysUes and Oonet1ete. In 1841 Newman published Tract .2.Q 
which examined the Thirty-nine Article. of the English Church, and tried to 
show that they agreed with the Roman Catholic creed and were enacted only 
against popular errore and exaggerations. Newman thought that by this 
tract he had vindicated the claim of the English Church to Oatholicity. 
Because of Tract 2Q Newman was ordered by Bishop Bagot to discontinue 
the aeriee of tracts. In 1842 Newman left Oxford and moved to the seclusion 
of Littlemore. In 184, he resigned his fellowship at Oriel. At Littlemore 
from 1842 to 1845 Newman studied the hiatory of doctrine and ita development, 
and prepared his ~esgr ~ l!! Development ~ Christian Doctrine, which was 
published late in 1845. The study which he did in preparing this work helped 
to convince him that the Roman Catholic Ohurch was the true Church ot Christ. 
On October 8, 1845, Newman was received into the Roman Catholic Church 
by Fr. Dominic Barberi, an Italian Paseion1et. In 1847 Newman wee ordained 
a priest in Rome, and shortly thereafter he entered the Congregation of the 
Orato,ry. He returned to England and founded Oratorie. in London and 
5. 
tt:gb8ston (Birmingham). In 1851 Newman WaS picked to be the first Hector of 
the Ca.thoUc University in Dublin, but he received 11 ttle cooperati.on in thie 
work. He failed in hie work on the University, but .Ih.! .!.S!.£ £! !. University 
was the result of' Nth/man's intellectual efforts in this matter. 
In 1864 Ne~tman wrote his Apologia pro ~ ~ in answer to attacka on 
him by Charles Kingeley. In 1870 Newman published his 1:; 13811 .!n .ill .2! A 
Grammar ~ Assent. This work was in answer to a problem that waB most im-
portant to him from his days at Oriel and throughout his life, the problem 
of the relation of reason and faith. 
Through much of his life in the Catholtc Church, Newman encountered 
opposition and suspicion trom the Oatholic heirarchy. Newman'. plane tor the 
Irish UniverSity, tor an Oxford Oratory, tor a new translation of the bible, 
and for working with a certain Catholic periodical were all opposed by hi. 
superiors. Newman WaS very sensitive and the many' reverses he sutfered as 
a Catholic must ha~ hurt him deeply. However, the end or any ecolesiastical 
suspicion of Newman was necessitated ~y Leo XIII when he made Newman a 
Cardinal in 1879. When Newman learned that he waB to be made a Cardinal 
he said, "The cloud is litted from me for ever. nlO 
John Henry Newman, like most philosophers, received the philosophical 
problems on which he WeS to work from his SOCiety and friends. The baeic 
10. 'lIard, ~, II, 446. 
6. 
cauee of the philosophical problems which Newman encountered in his society 
was rationalism. Beekraad says that the rationalism of this perlod in 
England was "not .30 much a doctrina as a. mode of thinking, an empbasis laid 
on the human mind as the faculty of reasoning, to the neglect of all other 
11 
elements. t! 'I'll. only type of reasoning ~ihich this rationalism recognized 
was formal and mechanical; the optimistic rationalists believed thgt with 
such an automatic tool man's reason would be unerring. In religious matters 
the spirit of rationalism had three main results: ~;videntialismt scientific 
scepticism, and sentimentalism. 
According to Evidentiallem a man's faith was only a8 good as the 
evidencea Bnd proofs which he could advance for it. Evidentialism made the 
assent of faith into a rather mechanical and inhuman conclusion to a ayllo-
gismo The chief exponent ot Evidentlalism was William Paley. Hie View. of 
--
~ Evidences ~ Ohristianity, P9bllshed in 1794, became the exemplar of the 
ti;vident1e.liat outlook on religion. Newman encountered i~vident1ali8m at 
Oxford and in the Oriel College. It WaS SAid Ulat the Common Room of Oriel 
12 College "stank of logio. 1t Rationalism had led the Oriel fellows not only 
toward Evidentialism but also toward a more rationalistic (or Itliberal n ) out-
look on other parts of theology in addition to apologetics. Newman saw that 
reasonable nnd logical men could investigate the evidences for Christianity 
and for God, end still remain doubtful; furthermore, he SaW the Evidentialist 
11 A.J • Beeleraad, !b! Personal Conquest .s: Truth according 12 !2h.!! 
Herlry Newman, LOUvain, 1955, 74. 
--12. Zeno.~ Henri Newman, .2!£.!!a.l 12 Cert,itude,Leiden,1957. p.v. of 
Introduction; quotation taken fraa Wh1tridge,~. Arnold ~ Rugby, 16~. 
7. 
method of arriving at faith to be at variance with hie own personal exper-
ience. In his Grammar ~ Assent he said, nIf I am asked to use Paley's 
argument for my own conversion, I say plainly I do not want to be converted 
by a smart sy110giem. n1, 
The second result of rationalism, also found at Oxford, and also with 
consequences in the religious sphere, was scientlsm or scientific scepticism. 
Scientific scepticism transfers the attitudes and methode which are required 
for science to ell other fields; the result is that certainty in any field 
can be attained only through explicit proofs of the type used in mathemat-
ieal physics. ~ven if such proofs are had, there still may remain a duty 
for the investigator to remain open to any further facts which may invalidate 
the proofs; therefore the advocate of scientific scepticism, in order to 
maintain a mind that is open and fair to facti, must f'orego certainty and be 
content with a high degree of probability. Nicolaus Theis saye that Newton 
and Locke were the intellectual lights of Oxford in Newman's time, and 
II philosophy had experienced a breaking-in of the mathematical method, and 
developed into geometry of the mind. 1114 Newman'e friend, ~'illiam Froude, 
younger brother of Harrell Froude, was an outstanding scientist and a 
scientific sceptic. In a lette~ to Newman he states his position that the 
human mind is not capable of arriving at an absolutely certain conclusion. IS 
13 Newman, ~ Essay ~!!a ~~ Grammar ~ Assent, ed. by C.F. Harrold, 
London, 1947, ,2,.This book will hereafter be referred to as 9! in these notes. 
14 Theis, Nicolaus, ~An den Quellen dee Pere&nlichen Dankens f Einf6hrung 
in J.H. Newman's 'Grammar of Assent,'· Newman Studien,lI, N~nberg, 1954, 167 
15 Harper, G.li. Cardinal Newman .!!!2. ';;Ul1am Froude ,_F .!i . .§!. • .! Oorres-
pondence, Baltimore, 19", 119-120. 
Net~mfln became thoroughly acquainted ltd th scientific scepticism through a 
long correspondence '?,hieh he andaUiam Froude carried on. 
The third result of rationalism in the religious sphere WaS a sort of 
sentimentalism which mak.es religion into a matter of taste or emotions. lJe-
cause a void had been left in the religious sphere through scientific ecept-
ichm's doctrine that reason cannot attain certitude about religious matters, 
many tried to fill this void with the power of human emotions. The truth or 
validity of a religion is then judged on the baaie of how it suite one's taste 
and emotions. Perhaps the reduction of religious belief to a mAtter of 
sentiment can Also be viewed as a reaction againat EvidentiaUem'e over-
emphasis of reaeon and reduction of religious belief to a eyllogistic con-
elusion. Newman found this sentimentalism in religion among Evangelicals 
and also among some "liberal" theologians whom he knew. He saw the falsity 
and the dangers in this attitude toward faith, and combatted it throughout 
his life. In a speech which he gave in Rome on the occasion of receiving 
the off'icial announcement that he had beli:n made a Cardinal, Newman said this 
about religious liberaliem: 
For thirty, forty, fifty years I have resiated to the best of my 
powers the spirit of Liberalism in religion • • • • Liberalism in 
religion is the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion, 
but that one creed i8 as good 8S another • • • • Rev,aled religion 
1s not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; •••• 10 
One of the purposes at the Oxford Movement had been to oppose the growing 
tendency to treat religion as emotional and non-intellectual. 
In l~vident1al1sm, scientific scepticism, and sentimentalism, Newman met 
challenges to his own faith. All three of theee results of rationalism made 
16 Ward, Life I II, 460. 
him investigate the true relation of reason and faith. This relationship 
waS first studied by Newman 1n his Oxford University sermons, which we~ given 
while he was an Anglican. For a long time he planned to develop more fully 
hie thought on the reason-faith problem. The result ot all of Newman'. 
thought on this problem was An Ess'y!n ~ ~~ Gr~ ~ A8sent. 17 Shortly 
after its publication in 1870, Newman wrote in a letter to Fr. Coleridge: 
"for 20 or ,0 years I have felt it a sort of duty to write upon it r=the sub-
ject of the Grammar ~ AS8en~ and I have begun again and again but never 
could get on." 18 Not only had Newman spent much time in thinking about 
the subject ot the Grammar ~ Aseent, but he also coneidered this work to be 
his last word on the subject: "1 have written and rewritten it more times 
than I could count. I have got up to my highest point -- 1 mean, I could 
not do better, did I spend a century on it, but then, it may be 'bad is the 
best.' n 19 
17 Newman gives this explanation of the title: "You 8ee, I called lt 
en Easay, as it really le, because it is an analytical inquiry. A Grammar 
ought to be synthetical. But to put it in synthetical form, had I after all 
attempted it, would have been to write a new book. And it would, to my own 
teelings, hav~ been bumptious." (letter to Canon Walker at April 8, 1870, 
quoted in 8oekraad, Personal Conquest, 191). Walgrave pOinte out that 
Newman intended to desoribe the struoture ot thought and disoover the mech-
anism and movement of it, using thought itselt as hie starting pOint, in the 
same way ae grammar derivee the lawe of language tram current use (J.ri. 
WalgravB, Newman lh! Theologian, t~w York, 1960, 62). 
18 Ward, Life, II, 268, 
19 Ibid,. 262. 
10. 
In the GraltDlar ~ Assent Newml3n shows that reason is othe~~r than what 
the Evidentialiste and scientlric sceptics 8ay it ie; therefore there i8 no 
need for a sentimentalism to tske over the sphere of religion. Behind theae 
three views is a talse rationslism which makes human reasoning into a formal, 
mechanical prooess. The main purpose of the Grammar of Assent 1. to show how 
reason, in its true meaning, hee a ri,ghtful plece in our way ot arriving at 
religious f'al tho In order to show the reb.til:,nehi p of reB80n to f&1th, 
Newman hed to analyze the nature of reasoning in man. The purpose or this 
thesis 1e to study this analysis of' reasoning. 
It should be kept in mind trom the start that Newman's theory of 
reasoning in the Grammar ~ Assent is not a complete theory of reasoning, nor 
was it meant to be such. H~s development of a theory of reasoning ia limited 
to a particular type: reaeoning which results in a concrete and individual 
conolusion. This limitation of his reasoning theory is shown by many ex-
pliCit statements and all ()f' hie examples in hie treetment of reascming,20 
and also by his ultimate purpose, as shown by the last chapter of the 
Grammar ~ Assent, an application ot hie reasoning theory to a question of 
concrete taet, whether or not the Ohristian religion i8 from GOd.21 
20 E.g., QA, 204, 211, 212, 219, 222, 251. 
CHAPTF.:R 11 
There ere good reasons for beginning a study of' Newman's doctrine on 
reasoning with a consideration of' f'ormel inference. First of' all, Newman 
undertook hie study of reasoning in reaction against a rationa11sm which 
he.d reduced reasl")ning to e f'ormal, mechanical process; his doctrine of' 
tQTmal interence presents such 8 mechanical view of' reasoning. Secondly, 
in the Grammar E! Assent, Newman considers formal inference f1rst,and then 
proceeds to consider natural and informal inference, both of which go beyond 
formal interence. ;:ince Newman's thought, both historically and as he writes 
in the trammer E! Assent, proceeds from a consideration of formal inference 
and ita inadequacies to B consideration of concrete reasoning as we actually 
find it in man, this seme order will be tollowed in this thesis. 
The first point to be considered is what interence and form.l inference 
meant to Newman. Inference in general f'or him signifies the conditional 
1 
acceptance ot a proposition. 
accepted on the condition of an 
thie simply: It',ve reason when we 
1 QA, 119, 197. 
2 .!.:2!.!!., 57. 
, Ibid., 197. 
It i8 conditional because a proposition ia 
2 
acceptance of its premisses. Newman states 
hold this by virtue of' that. It ' 
11 
12. 
Formal interence, which Newman sometimes calls "logical interence" or 
4 
simply "interence", 1s ratiocination reatricted and put into groove •• 0 that 
the mind will not run wild, but will advance with precie10n and effect.5 
Ratiocination is placed into orderly groove. through the uee of words; in this 
6 
way language i8 treated as though it ha. 8 monopolyof' thought. Formal 
interence, therefore, is reasoning aa it is marked out by words, propositiona, 
end syllogisms; it is verbal reasoning as opposed to mental rea.oning~ and 
logic is its scientific form. 7 
Formal inference is far more concerned with the comparison of propositions 
8 than with the propositions themeelves. Formal interence must regard propo-
s1tions not in relation to their own truth, or falsity, but in relation to their 
mutual consistency. Since the concern of formal inference is with the com-
parison ot propositions, whatever makes this comparieon easier and more 
accurate will aid formal interence. If' the words used in formal inference 
are made more Simple, definite, and narrow they will make comparison eaBier 
and more accurate and thus benefit the formal interence. The fliore that word. 
and propositions are made to express "exact, intelligible, comprehensible, 
communicable notions" and the less they stand for objective thing', so much 
~ore suitable they become tor formal tnterenoe.9 Since symbols, unlike words, 
4 E.g., !ill-, ,1, 69, 200. 
5 !ill., 200. 
6 !ill. 
7 Ibid. 
-8 !lli., 201. 
9 llli· 
1;. 
are most exact and constant in their meanings, they are the beet meane or 
10 
conducting the formal process of reasoning. After Newman hae concluded 
that symbols are most apt as members of syllogistic reasoning, he states the 
consequence of this foct on the meaning of words in .yllogisms: 
Symbolical notRtion, then, being the perfection of the syllogistic 
method, it follows that, when words ere substituted for symbols 
it will be its aim to circumscribe and stint their import 88 much 
as pOSSible, lest perehanee A should not always exactly mean A, 
and B mean B; and to make them, as much as possible, the calculi 
or notions, which are in our absolute power, ae meaning just what 
we choose them tf mean, and as little ae possible the tokens of 
real things ••••• 1 
Herein is contained one of Newman's fundamental tenet. on the nature or 
formal inference: in order that formal inference may accurately compare 
propositions, it must have a narrowness of meaning, and a lack of the depth 
of reality. 
However, Newman is not entirely unravoranle to formal inference.. In hie 
Oxford University Sermons, he calle Aristotelian logic (a scientific form of 
formal inference) the "boldest, simplest, and moat comprehensive theory which 
has been invented for the analysis of the re.soning process."12 In tne 
Grammar .2! Assent Newman even states that formal inference 18 someWhat 
natural to man: we think in logic as we talk in prose, without aiming at 
doing so, and we instinctively put our conclusions into words a8 far a8 we 
are able. 1, Newman finds formal inference useful ae a scientific method, a 
10 1..2!!., 201-202. 
11 ~.J 202-20,. 
12 Newman, Fifteen Sermons Preached before ~ University ~ Oxford, 
London, 1884, 258. In the Same sermon however, he 8ays that logic is main-
ly a orit1cal and negative teet of reasoning. (Ibid.,276) • 
1, GA ... 218. -
14. 
principle of order, and an intellectual standard. M Ii scientific method it 
enables us to progress beyond what gifted intellects cac,lld do by their own 
unaided power;l4 it helps us in finding and verifying conclusions; it shows us 
the coherence or weakness of a theory, and where further experiment and ob-
ser~tion are necessary.l5 As the great principle of order in thinking, 
formal interenoe cata~ogues the accumulations of knowl.dge and maps out the 
16 
relations of the eeparate departments of knowledge. As an intellectual 
standard, formal inference helps in providing a common measure between minda, 
thereby treeing us from the capricious ipse dixit of aUthority.l7 
Despite ell these usee of formal interence which Newman mentions, his 
usual attitude in the Grammar ~ Assent toward formal inference is one of un-
favorable criticism. He finds that formal inference haS these deficiencies: 
<a> it does not prove its premisses; (b) it does not reach the concrete and 
individual in its conolusions; (0) it is verbal and therefore inadequate in 
representing thought. 
(a) In a sermon given in l8~9, more than thirty years before the pub-
lication of the Grammar of Assent, Newman said that in any proof "there must 
ever be snmething assumed ultimately incapable ofproot'.1118 In another 
14 .!.ill.. , 198 • 
15 .!!'!!f. , 229, 217. 
16 .!.ill.. , 217. 
17 ,!lli., 199, 217, 275. 
18 New'lDan, Oxford Univere1 ty Sermons, 21;. 
15. 
sermon, preached in 1840, he stresses the importance of anteoedent view8 and 
presumptions in relation to formal proofs: the strength of the proof depends 
on whether the presumptions are accepted or n'it. 19 In the Grammar !!! Assent 
.Newman holds that if we follow '1er hal argumentation beck to 1 ts starting 
points we find first principles which are "tha recondite sourC"1 of know-
ledge, ae to which logic provides no common measure of minds.20• These first 
principles are rejected by some and accepted by others, end in them liea the 
whole problem .t attaining to truth; we are not able to prove by syllogism 
that there are any self-evident tirst principles at all, and therefore, 
21 
syllogisMS miss the most important part in the proceee of attaining truth. 
Many types of aesumptions that must be presupposed during formal infer-
eneee are mentioned by Newman. 22 Even in the most direct and levere kind of 
formal interence there must be thoee aesumptions in the process which are 
baaed on the conditions of human nature: our nature itself and our method of 
reasoning are assumptions. In le.s strict reasoning such as reasoning on 
conorete matters, there are assumptions that are quite subtle. These assump-
tions may arise from the sentiments of the age. country, religion, eocial 
habits and ideas of the particular inquirers or disputants. Because such 
assumptions may be admitted by all, they can pass and be accepted without 
19 .!.2!.!t., 273. 
20. .Q,!, 205. 
21 ll.!!. 
22 llli., 286; 205-206, 208. 
16. 
detection.. Another type of assumption arises from the nature of the case 
which is being treated: some cases might require assumptions to be made be-
cause of the tediousness of the proof in full, or because the full pr()of' 
would be 80 immenee in size that it would be practically impossible to write 
it down. Yet another type of assumption, and undoubtedly the moat important 
ot all, is the personal assumption. Such assumptions are baaed in the in-
tellectual, moral, and emotional charaoter of the individual person. No 
matter what the basis of an assumption may be, tormal inference 18 unable 
to prove the truth of it. Beoause of this impotenoe alone, formal inference 
by itself ~ould have to admit to uncertainty in its conolusions. However, 
in addition to its weakness at its beginnings, it ie found also to have 
another essential weakness at its oonclusionr this 1s it. inab1l1ty to reach 
in its conclusions the concrete and ind1vidual. 
(b) The inability of tormal inference to reach the concrete and individ-
ual tallows from the nature of the terms that are used in formal 1nference. 
According to Newman, each term in fommal inference is narrowed down in mean-
ing lIeo that it may stand tor just one unreal a.pect of the concrete thing to 
which it properly belonge, tor a relation, a generalization, or other abetract-
iona, tor a notion neatly turned out of the laboratory of the mind. and suf-
fiCiently tame and subdued because existing only 1n a defin1tlon.~2; Since 
formal inference 1s concerned with abstractions rather than with things, it 
can deal w1 th things only partially and indirectly. and thus abstract 
arguments can reach only the probaLle in concrete matters.:=?4 
Newman states that the terms used in tormal inference are not really 
universals, but are only "generals .tt25 Sinoe formal inference iB carried on 
by means of the so-called universals whioh are reall~ generals, all conolu-
sions of tormal inference wUl be true in general about the ooncrc'ie. but 
not universally and necessarily. Such oonclusjons can give a degree of 
probability about the concrete and individual, but not certitude. Newman 
illustrates hie dootrine on univereale with the following example: "All men 
haw their price; Fabricius is a man; he has hie price; but he had not his 
price; how is this? Because he is more than a universal.,,26 In this 
example the term "all men ll is not a genuine universal, nor does "having a 
price lt pertain to the very nature ot man. Such a general statement ae the 
major premiss of this .yllogism could lead at beet toa probable conclUSion, 
and not to a neoessary conclUSion. The concrete tact that someone actually 
will haye their price is not included within any universal 1n such a way 
that the fact can be deduced from the universal. 
Another example concerns the application ot general attributes of -man 
as such, the ty~ical man, the auto-anthropos_2 7 to individual men: 
24 Ibid., 211; ct. 204. 
-
25 Of. ~., 212. 
26 .!ill-
27 Ibid. 
But foe t:link 1,18 r:;e.y go on to impose our d3.t'i d ti on on the 1;lhole 
race, e.nd to every member of lt •••• No; each of them is what 
18. 
h. 1s in spite of it. Not anyone ot them is man, aG such, or 
coincides with the auto-anthropos. Another John is not necessarily 
rational, because ~all men are rational,» tor he may be an ldlot;--
nor because rtman 1s a being of progress, ,. doee the second Richard 
progre8~, faD he may be a dunce; -- nor, because "man is made for 
Society,q must we therefore go on to deny that the aecond Robert 
b a gipsy or a bandit, as he is f'o'.md to be .28 
This eXIMaplo is mor.a dit"f1cult. to analyze. The :first factor to be noted is 
that the conclusion \lIith which Newman is concerned is about a concrete fact, 
aa is indicated by the fact that the conclusions obtained trom the qualities 
of the 8uto-anthr0po8 are oontradioted by the concrate tacts about the man 
who 1a an idiot or dunce or gipsy_ The terms rational, being ~ progress, 
and ~ !.2!: BOCietl could in themselves be taken a8 reterring to a radical 
capacity and exigency in man tor thinking, progressing, and living 80clally. 
~uoh a meaning however oannot be the one intended by Newman 1n this example. 
His example refera obviously to concrete tacts. Attributes of man as such 
will not determine concrete tacts. It SOltleOne pretends to have dhcovered 
an attribute of man ae such wh1ch will enable one to determine a concrete 
fact about an individual, this attribute will be tound to be something that 
is generally true about individuals, but not universally true. 
Newman's next .x~ple on universals 18 this: 
All men diej theretore ~11ee has died; « •• but he has not died, 
8.M did not die. He was an exc<lptlon to the general law of humanity; 
eo tar, he dld not come under that law, but under the law (eo to 8ay) 
of Eliae. It ••• 113ut all men are mortal? 'I not 80; what is really 
meant bythh un1verea1,1e that "man, as 8uch, is mortal," that 18, 
28 .ill!., 213 
• 
19. 
the abstract, typical auto-anthropos; to this major premiss, the 
minor, of Elias is to be proved mortal, ought to be, ",~lias wae 2 
the abstraot man;~ but he was not, and could not be such, •••• 9 
If mortal in this example referred to a radical eXigency in man for death, 
mortal 110uld be a universal in the true aenae. However, as always, Newman 
is conoerned here with c'ncrete tacts in the conclusion. The statement, 
'l -ill .!!!! .!!!. mortal, is taken by Newman to mean that every man does !!! .!!.2! 
die; auch a statement would be general rather than universal. 
Th~ inability ot formal inference to reach the conorete and individual 
has been treated in some detail here in order to clarity two pointe. (1) The 
more important point is th.t Newman i8 concerned with the attainment ot con-
crete ,ofacte in oonolusions. (2) A more subtle pOint i_ that so-oalled 
universals which are used to determine concrete fact_ are really only gener-
alizationsof tacts. Such general term. cannot accomplish the determination 
ot concrete facts. 
The inability of formal inference to reach the concrete is a .erioue 
weakness. Even if a solution to the problem of the lnability ot logic to 
prove its assumptions were found, logic or furmal inference would still be 
~nable to determine ooncrete facts. This inability of formal inference i.e 
especially important for Newman in the Grammar ~ Assent becau.e his purpose 
is to diecuss how man oan reason to the divine origin of Christianity, which 
is a question of concrete fact. 
29 !lli. 
}O In Ii footnote in a later part of the Grammar 2!. Assent, Newman 
says that what he has called the "concrete" is what Aristotle in 
his Nieomaohean Ethics oalled the "contingent.- (GA,268. notel). 
20. 
(c) A further inadequacy of formal inference, according to Newman, 
follows from the fact that it i9 verbal. Since formal inference i. verbal, 
it does not do justice to the mind, which i8 more vigorous than any of its 
;1 
works, of which language is one. Words are inadequate carriers of thought: 
"Thnught 1s too keen and manifold, its sources are too remote and hidden, its 
path too personal, delicate, and circuitous, its subject matter too various 
and intricate, to admit of the trammels of any language t of whatever subtlety 
and of whatever campase_",2 
In this chapter we have seen Newman's vieWB on the nature at formal 
inference, and on the value. and inadequacies of this type of inference. In 
the remainder of the theeis we will investigate how Newman .olve. the problem 
of these inadequacies: lack of proot of assumptions, inability to reach the 
concrete and individual tact, and limitation to what can be verbalized. 
,1 Q!, 21;; ct. 206. 
;2 Ibid., 216; ct. 201. 
CHAPTSR 111 
NATUHAL Il\F£RENCS 
'1e will begin our study of Newman's solution of the problem of the inad-
equacies at formal interence in regard to concrete conclusions by studying 
!hie theory at natural interence. This type of inference 18 called natural 
because it is the moat ordinary mode ot reasoning end is used by the uned-
~cated and by men of genius. This Dl.ode of interence difters from formal 
~nference in that it is "not from propositions to proposition., but from 
p;.hinga to things, from concrete to concrete, from whole. to whole •• n 1 
~atural inference works directly on concrete and whole realitie. without the 
~edlation of propositions. 
The outstanding characteristic of natural inference i8 ita simplieity. 
~atural inference, which i. our usual type of reasoning, ia a simple act, not 
~ process or series of act •• 2 "We apprehend the antecedent and then appre-
~end the consequent, without explicit recognition of the medium connecting 
he two, as if by a sort of direct association of the first thought with the 
econd.'" orten even the antecedent itself ie only indirectly recognized aa 
he antecedent or subject for analysis; thus not only the proce •• of the in-
erence is ignored, but in some caeee the antecedent itself is a110 ignored. 
1 !!A, 251. 
2 .!!!!., 197, 250. 
, ..Illi., 187. 21. 
22. 
4 ITo the mind itself the reasoning is a simple divination or prediction." This 
simplicity of natural inference i8 explained by Newman 8S the result of an 
It instinctive perception. ~t By instinct Newman does not mean that the faculty 
is the same in strength and quality in all men, but rather that the prOcess of 
reasoning is unconscious and Implicit. 5 6y this reasoning instinct we are able 
to reason spontaneously, without conscit'lusnese ot the reasoning, and without 
6 
effort or intention of reasoning. Newman defines instinct in the Grammar 
2! Assent as a "perception of tacts without aseignable media ot perceiving. 11 7 
In a letter to Dr. Meynell Newman says nBy instinct I mean a realization ot a 
8 particular ••• without assignable media of realization. II This instinct is 
the heart ot natural inference. By means of it one can conclude directly 
about a concrete tact with no consciousnes8 of how one proceeds to the con-
elusion. 
:Since natural inference i8 instinctive in this sense, it oannot be 
analyzed so as to give a clear account of how a particular conclusion was 
reached. Natural interence is 11ke taste, skill, and invention in the .fine 
arts, or discretion in conduct in that these are exerted spontaneously and 
4 ll!!., 251. 
5 Of • .lli!!., 197, 250-251. 
6 Of'. !ill. . J 197 -198 • 
7 ll!!., 254. 
8 nThe Newman-Meynell Correspondence,n appendix of Zeno, i. ~. Newman, 
240. Meynell, a "SCholastic· philosopher, checked over the Grammar ~ 
Assent for Newman before it was published. 
are not entirely explainable.9 Newman had long recognized man's power of 
implicit or instinctive reasoning. In an Oxford University sermon which he 
preached in 1840 he 8aid! "All men have a reason, but not all men can give 
a reason. The process of reasoning is complete in itself, and independent. 
The analysis is but an account of it; it does not make the conclusion 
correct!~O ae compares this implicit reasoning to mountain climbing' 
And thus it [reason] makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a 
steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt hand, and firm foot; ascends 
how he knows not himself, by personal endowment and by practice. 
rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him, and unable to 
teach another. ll 
!hue far we heve seen that natural interence deale with things directly, 
and is a simple unanalyzable act with no consciousness of a proce.s within 
the act. The fact that we are not conscious of the process of this act is an 
indication of the nature of natural inference; "as we cannot .ee ourselves, 
so we cannot well see intellectual motives which are so intlmately ours, and 
which spring up from the very conetit_tion of our minds."l2 !hese motives 
are taken up into the action of the illative or ratiocinative principle of 
the mind which is an intrinsic and personal power. This illative principle 
assimilates theee motives and moves toward or to the conclusion, with the 
motives themselvee, however, remaining unconscious. Thus the end result is 
9 2!. 257 e. 
10 Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 259. 
11 .!.2!:!., 257. 
12 Q!, 255. 
24. 
a divination or prediction. 
Newman throws more light on the nature of at leaet some ca.es of 
natural inference whan he 8ays that what ie oalled reasoning is often only a 
peculiar and personal mode of abstraction. l ; "It ie a power of looking at 
thinge in eome particular •• pect; and of determining their internal and ex-
14 ternal relations thereby.d Therefore the unconscious mechanica of natural 
inferenoe may be made up at abstraction of an aspect ot a thing with the 
recognition that this aspect involves a relation to some other ractor} this 
relation to the other factor is the oonclusion. By meane at this type of 
natural inference "a word or an act on the part ot another 1e sometimes a 
Budden revelation; light breaks 1n upon UI, and our whole judgment of a 
course of events, or of an undertaking ie changed.~15 Thi. abetraction and 
determining ot relatione is done libya senee proper to ourselve.," since 
~omeone else may .ee the same phenomena as we do but come to • different 
conclusion because he abstracts a dirterent eet of general notions trom the 
phenomena. 16 This l:oaMe proper to ourselve." doee not reter'to a aeneitive 
power a8 opposed to an intellective power, but rather it refers to the 
Illative Sense which is a power of the mind. This Illative Sense will be 
studied in the chapter on informal inference. 









Natural interence hae the peculiarity of being departmental: it is 
attached to e definite subject-matter according to the aptitude of the in-
dividual. 
No one w0uld for a moment expect that because Newton and Napoleon 
both had a genius for ratioCination, that in consequence, Napoleon 
could have generalized the prinCiple of gravitation. or NewtoY7have 
seen how to concentrate a hundred thousand men at Austerlitz. 
Different persons will be Skillful in different fields of natural interenee. 
The faculty of natural interence is not one general instrument of knowledge, 
but is rather fta collection of similar or analogous faculties under one 
name.- l8 That there are as many distinct but similar faculties of natural 
interence ae there are subject matters, is exemplified by Newman's descr1pt-
ions ot men who excel in one field ot reasoning, but are poor reasonere 1n 
other fields. l9 Furthermore, natural interence i8 not the only mental skill 
that is departmental; so also 18 memoryt various people have clifferent 
memories, ~.&. for poetry or dates, vocabulary of languages, face., names, 
or day-to-day occurreneee.20 
The fact that natural interence is departmental has an important conse-
que nee in the way in which we ehould go about acquirillg knowledge. In be-
ginning to learn any field we must trust persons who have experience in their 
field, rather than trust logical science. ~e must take up a subject as those 
11 !ill., 251. 
18 Ibid. 
19 ot.!.!?!2.., 251-258. 
20 ~. J 258-259. 
26. 
viho are proficient in 11', took it up, beginning at the beginning and giving 
ourselves to it, dependir.g more on praotice and experience than on reasoning; 
thus, we gain that mental insight into the field which the masters of it have.2 
Newman quotes Arietotle on this matter: 
\-:e are bound to gi vo heed to the undemonst.rated sayings and 
opinions of the experienced and aged, not lee8 than to demonstrations; 
because their having the eye ot experience, they behold the principles 
of th1ngs.22 
Natural inference is found in all men, especially however in the uned-
ucated and in men of genius.2, The reason for this fact 1. that Ule uneducated 
do not know about, intellectual aids and rules such as logic, and the men of 
genius care nothing about such rules and aide. Newman also saye that lithia 
divination [natural inference] comes by nature, and belongs to all of' us in 
a measures, to wOI'Ilen more than to men. 1124 
Newman25 g1 ves mall¥ examples of' natural inference. I will indicate some 
of them here. A weather-wise peasant may be unable to give reasons why he 
thinks it will be a fine day tomorrow, but this fact doesn't weaken his con-
fidence in hie prediction. His mind does not proceed step by step. He feels 
together the torce of various combined phenomena, though he is not conscious 
of them. 
21 Of. .!..!U:!. t 259. 
22 l2!i.; the reterence to Aristotle 1s given a8 ~.N1oam •• vi.11,fin. 
2, Of. ibid., 198, 251. 
-
24 !ill. , 252. 
25 Ibid. , 252-25'. 
27· 
30me physicians excel in the diagnosis of oomplaints, thQugh they could 
not give defenee for their diagnosis against that of another physician. 
Newton perceived mathematical and phye1cal truths without giving proof: 
his rule for ascertaining the imaginary roots of equations wae without proof 
for a century and a half and rested on no other evidence than Newton'a lagacity. 
rbes~ examples of natural inference show that it is an immediate and 
spontaneous grasping of the conoludon wit.hout a con8ciol,18 grasping of its 
reasons, with the result that the conclusion cannot be defended. The con-
clusion is about a concrete fact, and the unconscious reasons for the con-
clusions are themselves perceptions of concrete fact; worde and propositions 
are not uead in arriving at the conclusion. 'rhe only juetificat10ns or the 
conclusion are the reasoner's paat experience and the actual truth of the 
conclusion. 
'Je shall now see how well natural interence supplies help for inade-
quacies of formal inference (limitation to the verbally representable level 
of thought, inability to prove its assumptions, and inability to determine 
concrete contingent facts). Natural inference has given the solution to the 
problem of the limitation of formal interence to the verbally expressible 
level of thought. Natural inference is non-verbal and non-propositional; it 
works from things to things and from concrete to concrete. Natural inference 
has not solved the problem of the inability of formal inference to prove its 
assumptions. The assumptione of natural inference are not only unproved, ~ley 
are also unknown. Not to know one'a aesumptions is worse than to know oneta 
assumptions and be unable to prove them. However, if the person who ie 
28. 
using natural int'erence b familiar with the '~ubject-watter on _;hich he ie 
working, it eeeme as though he l~,juld make the correot assumptions in this 
subject~atter; but even in such a case the assumptions would not be proved 
nor known explicitly_ 
Natural inference is an answer to tho problem of formal inferenoe of 
reaching concrete and contingent facts. Newman ha.d objected that formal 
inference could not determine contingent facts because it U8ed so-called 
universals and abstractione which could not deterwine the concrete and con-
tingent. Natural infer.nc., in prooeeding from thin,. t.o things and from 
concrete t.o concrete and from whol_ to wholes, u.e. no universals t.o deter-
mine i t8 conclusions. Therefore it avoids the problem whleh tormal inference 
involves of proceeding from a narrow verbalized aspect ot reality to a con-
oret. tact of reality_ Although natural inference dOle avoid this problem, 
it still does not justify the prooese by which it does proceed to the new 
concrete fact. Its process is impliCit, and its sole justification 118s in 
the facts that it is a natural process and that it wOJ'ke. 26 
\~e s.e that althou.,:;h natural inference bringl'l r .... oning above the _rely 
verbal level of thought and works directly on concrete reality and gives 
concrete conclusions, it still leaves the tollowing difticult.ies in realon-
ing: (1) Natural inference can account neither tor it. assumptions nor for 
its own unc(";nscioue prooess (except by its naturalness and succeea): the 
question is therefore raised as to whether there 18 a conscious counterpart 
26 Ott this thesis, 54-57, for a consideration ot Newman and nominalism, 
and wh.ther he can consist.ntly speak of the nature ot anything. 
of natural inferenco \'/hich cen acoount for its aseumptions and process. 
(2) Natural inference does not explain how the mind works on lonr, complicated 
calles 1n which the parts of the argument and groupings of these parts mUllt at 
S~me tIme be seen separately; in suoh a case, the whole would be too large to 
be taken in at first '1ith one unconscious view of it. (~) Natural inference 
dO$~ not explain how formal inferenoe is to be of use to man. Newman haa 
stated earlier in ~ Grammar ~ Assent that formal inference 1s ueetul,27 
but natural inference 1s unconscious and non-verbal, and therefore cannot be 
aided by formal inference. In the next chapter we will investigate Newman'. 
theory at informal inference and the Illative Sense 1n order to learn whether 
this theory can giv3 a solution to the problems of reasoning raised thus far. 
, 
27 af. QAt 198, 199, 217, 229. 
r 
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I OEAPTER IV 
INFORMAL INFERENCZ 
Informal inference tor Newman is fundamentally a oWllUlation ot probabil-
i ~ ~ ltiee whioh together enable U8 to be certain ot a concrete and individual 
I j conclusion. Newman tirst learned the importance ot probabilities trom Butler t 6 
i ; 1 I Analogy; however he developed hi. doctrine of the cumulation of probabilities 
I 
I:· tar beyond Butler's doctrine on probability. For Butler. probabilities gave the answers to practical questions only, tor Newman, probabilities also enable I 
I 
Ius to attain answers to speculative que.tions: "Butler tends to reduce the 
I 
~ 
icertainty to a practical certainty, viz. that it is eater 12 act A! 1! th~ 
I I conclusion were true; I maintain that probabilities lead to a .peoulative I certainty. ,,2 
~ I The probabilities which are accWllUlated in informal interence are called 
Iprobabilities beoau.e!!£h~ ot the., taken separately, 1. a probable indi-
I"Cation ot the conclusion. Oonsidered in itaelf, each one of the probabilitie. ,is really known certainly by the realoner; ita probability lies in it' function 
\ •• 1nd1 •• ~1ng by itself. a.nolu.1on. forhapa P. Planagan .tots. \hi. aoro 
I 
" , 1 J. Butler, !!:!. AnaleR' !l! R.l~ionl :Natwal.!!!!!. Revealed, 12 ~ 
Oonstitutlo ~ Oourse !l! Nature, 17 • 
2 From Newman's letter to Canon Valker. 1664; quoted in Boekraad, 
Personal Conquest, 268. Harper pointe out that the scientific sceptic, 
,Willi .. Froude, seems to have adhered more striotly than Newman to Butler's 
~ictum that probability is the guide of life (Harper, Newman.!!a! Froud •• 124-
~125) • 
" 
clearly '''ihen he Bays that "the probahili ty attache8 not to the existence of 
the evidence but to the judg1l1ent which each isolated piece of evidence will 
warrant.,,3 T~jia fact is not stated explicitly by Ne\ofmen in the Grammer 2! 
Assent, but it is qUite clearly implied throughout the section on informal 
inference; he does state that the ar&umen~ of informal 1r~erenc. are, in 
4 their letter, probabilities; callir.g the argument a probablli ty indicates 
that the conclusion 1s probably determined by the piece of evidence, even 
though the evidence itself is certainly known. 
'Cach of t.heee cumulating probabilities must be independent of one another' 
If they were not independent, their cumulation would not heve ae much meaning 
and strength in pointing out a conclUSion. These probabilities should confirm 
6 and correct one another. By their mutual c')nfirmation the cumulation of 
probabilities is able to converge toward one conclusion. If the probabilities 
were not independent their mutual confirmation end correction would have no 
added value toward indicating a conclusion. The converging probabilities, 
however, do not actually touch the conclusion in the way that a demon.8trat1on 
does. The conclusion in concrete matter 18 roreseen or pred1cted rather than 
? P. Flanagan, Newman. Faith and 1h! BelIever, Westminster, 1946, 101. 
l~ 2, 22,. 
5 .lli.2,., 219, 242. 
6 ~., 222. 
actually grasped.7 In a letter written in 1846, when a French edition of his 
Oxford University Sermons and ~eeal 29 Development wae being prepared, 
e Nel'lIDan said, "I use 'probable' in opposition to 'demonstrative'." Such a 
meaning for probable is not necessarily opposed to what is certain, but only 
to what is demonstrated.9 Arguments ~hich are probable in the sense that 
they do not demonstrate the conclusion,can still require en aesent w1th 
certitude from us. 
Ne~~n compares the way that the cumulation of probabilities in informal 
inference arrives at its conclusion '-lith the way that fl regular polygon 1rl-
Bcribed in a circle tends to became that circle as its sides are continually 
diminished. lO As this tendency of the polygon to become the circle never gets 
beyond a tendency, eo aleo the accumulated probabilities of informal inference 
converge toward a conclusion, and "approach it more nearly than any assignable 
difference, yet do not touch it logically, (though only not touching i~) on 
account of the nature of its subject-matter. and the delicate and implicit 
character of at least a part of. the reasonings on which it depends. !Ill We 
ehould note that the subje«t-matter of informal inference ia suoh that it 
cannot be touched 10glcally in aD¥ way, either by the cumUlation of probabil-
7 !.!?!!! ., 244. 
8 ':Jard, 1lli, I, 168. 
9 In this thesis I will not treat directly of certitude because it is 
an assent, rather than the mere result of interence. 
10 Q!, 244. 
11 lbld. 
i ties in .informal inference or by the universals of formal inference. rhe 
converging probabilities however, unlike the universals of formal inference, 
can render the conclusion ilas good as proved" or they can Ilamount to a 
proof": the proof is the limit of the converging probabilities, as the circle 
is the limit of the approaching polygon in Newman's analogy.l2 
The converging probabilities are called by Newman "subtle and circu-
itous,'l l , "delicate and implicit,l1 l4 "intricate" and Ilin part inviBlble."l5 
Thus it is seen that the converging probabilities that u:.ake up informal in-
ference do not have the obviousness that characterizes formal inference, but 
rather partake of the implicitness of natural inference. The reasons of in-
formal inference may often be missed by people because of their subtle 
character. but not all of the converging probabilities ere subtle; Newman 
Bays that they are more or less implicit and that at least part of the reason-
ing is delicate and implicit,16 hinting that some parts are explicit. 
The convergence of' probabilities in inforlkal inference i8 something that 
is felt 88 a whole, rather than something that can be exactly enumerated. 
~ewman saye that the probabilities are too numerous and various to be convert-
12 ~ . 
1, 
.!ill- , 219. 
14 .ill!!. , 244. 
15 .!ill. , 250. 
16 Cf. .!.2!!!., 222, 244. 
ad into syllogisms .17 These numerous probabilities work on the mind in a 
body, by some sort of unwritten summing up; tr1is body of probabilities which 
i th D i 1 > ad 18 A 1 t thi j d t k d e e prooJ. s seen on y as a (.) y. na ogous 0 a U groan loIase on a 
body of pr 001' seen only as a body is the way by which we distinguish tho old 
from the young, 8r brothers from one another, without being able to give the 
reasons for the distlnotlons. l9 Not only is the body of proof taken as a 
whole'in informal inference, but also the conclusion is taken as a whole to-
gather with the body of proof: "le grasp the full tale of premieeae and the 
conclusion. per ~ uniu9, - - by a sort of instinctive perception ot the 
legitimate conclusion in and through the premiesee."20 Again Newman comparee 
this perception to the way in which an object ot sense presents itselt to our 
view as one whole, and not in eeparate parte.21 
In the matter of the impl1citnesl of proof' end in the fact that tht) 
proof and conclusion are taken a8 a whole, informal inference i8 not identical 
to natural inference. Newman says t.hat the procesa of' informal inference is 
tl more or leas implicit, ,.22 whereas the process of nat.ural inference is oom-
plately impl1cU.. Newman indicates the great.er expl1citnese of informal 
17 .!ill-, 219. 
18 cr. ~., 222 
19 Ibid. 
-
20 !ili. , 229. 
21 lbid. 
-
22 Ibid., 222. 
-
inf'erenoe &.3 compa.red to natural 1ntaT<ltnce both 111 hi::! examples of informal 
l.nference 2, -;00 by hls t.heory. The very fact that 3 cumulo.tion of pl'obabil-
i ties is U33d in informal inference 9uggeste tilat tho various part3 of the 
proof' mul:"t be known; thene parts must be neen to e01tl.e extant individually and 
explicitly in order that thay oan be known an independent and corrob~ratlng 
ont':! anothor. Tho fact that informal 1nf'erencs, unlike natural inference. has 
Ui.10 for the explicit processes of formal inference, aleo indicate!! the re1-
ative ex/?l1ci tneofl ",r informal inference .~ono, in comparing the explicitnes8 
of informal inference and Datural inference, atates that in the former lithe 
probable propositionfJ c:mverging to one definite point, are more or laas 
expUoitly prominent in the mind though not in all details, wherea!!! with the 
latt~r there 1s no explicit consoiousness of antecedents at all. n24 
In a sermon given at Oxford Univerdty in 18'9, Newman saids lloA good 
and a bad man 'lli11 think very ditfer<::>:nt things probable. ,,25 The idea behind 
this layil~ was later developed by Ne~nan in the Grammar ~ Assent, whore 
Newman attaches much importance to the personal slemente in the acqui8ition 
ot truth.26 ',~e should expect. tilat pernonal clements would be important in 
informal interenoe sinoe the probabilities uhich are to oonverge toward a 
2, Of.~., 22'-228, 2:50-240, 245-2~, for exampl .... 
24 Seno, l.. 11. Newman, 140. 
25 :rlewman, O,.~ord Sermons, 191; ct. alao 2'7. 
;~6 r~.g., QA, 22" 229, 2,5, 24" 249; cf. alao Newman'. letter to 
Fr. Ooleridge in 1871, in Ward, ~. II, 270. 
~. 
conclusion in informal inference are often subtle and partly invisible; a man 
with the wrong personal dispositions may find that for him the probabilities 
arc too subtle or invisible and therefore have no value in indicating the 
truth of a conolusion.27 Nel>tman saw personal faotore involved throughout the 
reasoning process: in relation to first principles and the way that a ca.e is 
viewed, in relation to anteoedent reasons and prejudice., 2nd in relation to 
the acceptance of probabilities and their convergence. 
The personal elemente that Newman mentions a8 important in concrete 
reasoning pertain to the m~al, intellectual, and experiential aspects of a 
person. The moral character of a person influence. the way in which he .ees 
first principles of truth: -perception of its r=truth'a~ first principle. 
which is natural to us is enf.ebled, obstructed, perverted, by allurement. 
of sense and the supremacy at self', and on the other hand, quickened by 
28 
aapirationa atter the Bupernatural. n Newman'a vl*w on the relationship 
between prudence and reasoning aleo indicates the prominence at peraonal 
moral faot.ora in his reasoning theory. He holds that the moral quality of 
prudence is required in all non-abetraot proote.29 The judicium prudenti. 
viri Is the standard of certitude in all concrete mat.ters, not only in case. 
of practice but also 1n speculative questions (in regard to truth or falSity) 
ae the supplement. of logio.~ In addition to prudence, other personal moral . 
27 GA. 22~. 
28 .!!!!., 2~7. 
29 .lli.2. ., 241. 
,0 Ibid. 
prerequiai tes for infer ring; truth in concr('te matter inc lude 8 sense of duty 
and an intellectual conscientiousnese)l In special fh: Ida of inquiry, ot.i1t'lr 
added moral qualities are required; NefJman says this about inquirers in the 
field of religion: rtTbey must be 'as much in earnest about religion. aa about 
their temporal affairs. capable of being convinced, on real evidence, that 
there is a God who gove,ns the world, and feel themselves to be of e. moral 
nature and accountable creatures.' 1I~2 Without such ,;oral prerequisites a 
person is most likely to misunderstand,or to miss completely, arguments about 
religious matters. 
Although Ne'l'llIlan stresseJ the m.oral personal elements in concrete rea80n-
ing, he also mentions intellectual and experiential factors in reasonings which 
are personal. In commenting on a statement by Coleridge about the relation 
of God and creatures, Newman mentions theee personal elements which would 
determine how much benefit one could derive from Coleridge's statement: "The 
general state of our ment.al discipline and cultivation, our own experience, 
our appreciation of religious ideas, the perspicaCity and steadiness of our 
intellectual vls1on."~~ In other places Newman~peak8 of strength of mind, 
power of sustained attention, and pre.entimente and opinions .e personal 
factors which influence one's reasoning • 
. ~l ~ •• 242. 
j2 .!lli., 2J,.}; Nei'lman says his quotation is from Butler, Analogy ,278. 
;; ~., 2,2. 
34 Of. !ill .. 2~5f 240. 
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Newlllan finde that the r;eraonal element in informal inference is indioated 
by the language used to deocrlbe concrete conolusions. 
,'ia are considered to teel, rather than to see, its cogency; and we 
decide, not that the conclusion must be, but that it cermot te 
otherwise .,e say that we do not see our wP!y to doubt it, that 1 t 
is 1n;poEllble to doubt, that we are bound to believe it, that we 
should be idiots, if we did not believe. ~5 
Newman states that phrases such as these are used when doubt is altogether 
abs6nt 1n order to signify that we arrived at the conclusions not by a sc1en-
tif'1c neceesity independent of OW"eehes, but by the act,ion of our minde under 
a sense of duty to the oonclusions end ?,.ith intellectual coneclentioueness. 36 
A man haa s dut:{ to accept some things as true; to act otherwise would be to 
act as an idiot would act. F~ven though we oannot demonatrate lome conclusions, 
we knot'l that they cannot be otherwise. 
The tact that the f.reonal element is so important in the attainment of 
truth in concrete matters has important eonsequ.ncee in the ways in which such 
matters are to b~ taught or learned. 'Ne'lml1n eays that Will should use language 
lito stb)ulate, 1n those to 'Nhom we address oUT3elvfu, a mode of thinldng and 
trains of thought similar to our own, leading the~ on by their ~.n independent 
aetton, not by any syllogistic compulsion."'7 Such a method of teaching will 
produce better results because it considers the manner in whl{:h the :n.ind oper-
ates, as living and per90nal, and not as a computer which can be foroed to 
give specific results if it is ted specific data. The prooedure ot learning 
,5 !!:.!!., 241. 
,6 ~., 242. 
'7 Ibid., 2,5. 
is also Bf"f'eot.ed by the importance of the personal element in acquiring 
truth. "Our er1t6r1~n of truth is not eo much the manipUlation ot proposition. 
~B the intellectual and moral character of the ~erson maintaining them. n;8 
The teBcher'e personal qualities indioate how trustworthy his teachi~ may be. 
It is not merely by chanoe or by man's planning that such 8 process aa 
informal illference enet.e. Newman ftatee that informal inference 1111 the 
method by hhich we reach certitude in concrete matters 'from the nature of the 
cas •• and trOlll the constitution of the hUllfln n;ind.".59 Because of the nat.ure of' 
the human mind it must use the method of converging probabl.li ties it it 1& to 
reason to concrete conclusions and attain certitw.1e about then:. Newman calle 
it a "law of our nature,* that we accept as true an~ Qssent absolutely to 
40 propoelt1ona th8t are not logioally demonstrated by their premi$ees. 
fl'undemental to the supra-logical proceases of inforlIlal and natural 1nfer-
ence 10 their principle, the Illative Sense. In a letter to Dr. Meynell, 
Nelwl"..an says ~ "~\.(t I conoidal" Ratiocina.tion :rar highsx-, fJ.oro subtle, wider, 
more cel'tfiin t.han logical interonce, fmd its pr:i.nciple of action is the 
lfI 11at1 ve Seuse, f1 which I trea.t of towards the el1d, of the volume [the Ormromar 
J lt41 of' ABsent • Although the Illative ~~en3e 1s called iii sens!'), it is an in-
ItO ~:ard, 1!.r.!, II, 248, from a letter ~'1f Newman's to H. ';I'ilberforcc 
in 1868; Harper, Newman.!E! Froude, 202. 
JH i'/ard, 1!!!. II, 258. 
J.fO. 
tellec'tual pO,i¢r; N'2'w'ltlt<n point~· out that he is ul!in';:0 "sense 'I as pers-Uel to its 
42 
use in good .!!!P..!!.. COIf.m.on een.~IJ, £ sense .9! be,.uty_ In the Grammar ..2! 
Assent, Nel'lmEan calle 'the Ill.tive Sense t.he ?Srteetion or virtue of the per-
sonal aetlon of the :ratiocinative fuulty;4, it it! the power ot' judging end 
concludir4!. i.n ito perfeetion.44 By ecmparir.g these descriptione of the Illativ~ 
fense 'dt.h {,hat gi.ven in the btter to Or. Meynell, we discover thst the 111a-
tive Bense he.d tNO meanings for NeWlllan: t.he prin.eiple of concrete reasoning in 
everyone, and t.he perfectil'm of the principh (If rea8onir;g. Everyone has an 
Illative ·.n~ •• yet the Illattve Sense implies a perfection of rea$oning. It 
eeemE~ that theee two meanings of the Illative Senae ehO\lld be taken as two 
aspects of :ran's reasoning pOlA'er: the first aspect 18 t""l11s power in ell much 
as it CO!tE!S from th$ very IU1ture of me.n; t.he second it! thh power as it exists 
in gifted or exrerhnced reasoner::'. Much of Newl'I18n'lI exposition of the 111-
ntbe Sense b through analogies beti'ieen t,he I llat.he ~ense and parallel 
fJfI'tlmlln h,"ld~ the.t f1hroneeis 1ncludtHl two Q(!pe·cts per.HEll t,o the two of the 
Illative Sense! "It. [Phrcr.eCi$] cOJ)l(}e of an acquired habit, th~U€~h it hea its 





Il4 !~.,26S; cf'. also 260 and 214 for similar definitions. 
/~5 ~., 269. 
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The function of the Illative Senae is to be the ultimate test of tr.uth 
and error in our inf'ereneee in concrete reasoningsj46 it is II a rule to itself, 
and appeals to no judgment beyond 
giems, and is more versatile than 
its own; M47 
48 
they are. 
it goes beyond words and 8y110-
Newman again ueee senses 
parallel to the Illative Senee 1n order to show the reasonableness of the 
supremacy of the Illative Senee in its field, It just as there is no sufficient 
test ot poetical excellence, heroio action, or gentlemanlike conduct, other 
than the particular mental senee, be it genius, taste, sense of propriety, 
or the moral sense, to which these subject-matters are ee.erally Cammited,·49 
30 also is the Illative Sense the test of' reasoning, in concrete matter. 
Phroneeis eBpecially is stressed by Newman as a power of the mind similar to 
the Illative ,?ense in its ability to go beyond rules and deel with the con-
crete.5O Only by our own phrones!s can we decide our own personal needs and 
our own golden mean; ethical rules are not 1n themselves enough for the par-
ticular case, and can be applied to the particular caee only by the living 
action ot the intellect. Likewise, in the field ot reasoning on concrete 
matter, the rules at logic are inadequate by themselvesj we are obliged to use 
the Illative Sense 1n reasoning on concrete matter, and thereby we are apply-
ing the living aotion of the intellect as the final norm of reasoning. 
46 !ill. , 27". 
47 !lli. , 274. 
48 !E.!:A. , 228, 27'. 
49 Ibid. , 27'. 
50 !ill- , 268-271. 
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Another similarity of the Illative ;Janse and l:1lronesis 18 found in the 
fact that both are departmental: 1.~., both phroDeai8 and the Illatiye Sense 
tend to be attached to particular subject-matters, rather than to be of equal 
power in all subject-matters.51 
Properly speaking, there are as man, kinds of phrone.is as there are 
Yirtues; for the judgment, good sense, or tact which is conspicuous 
in a manls conduct in one subject-matter, is not necessarily trace-
able in another. • •• he may be just and cruel. braye and sensual, 
imprudent and patient. 52 
I n a a1milarmanner. taste and ski 11 are used in reference to painting, 
architecture, music, or gymnastic exercises, even though no one taste or skill 
is applicable to all of these; rather, there i.s a taste or sk.ill united indis-
solubly to the SUbject-matter of each f1eld.5~ In the same manner, the 
Illative ':)enee may be possessed by a peraon in one department of thought, for 
54 instance, history, and not in another, tor instance, philosophy. In 1871 
in the preface to the third ed1 tion of hh Oxford UniYersi ty Sermons, Newman 
gaye reasons for the departmentality of reasoning. 
Thl8 inequality of the faculty in one and the same individual, 
with respeot to difterent subject-matters, ariees trom two oauses, 
fram want ot experience and familiarity in the details of a given 
subject~tter; and tram ignorance of the principles or axioms, 
ofterl recondite, v,?hich belong to it. 55 
51 1e have already seen that natural inferenee, which is oarried on 
by the Illative Sense, is departmental. Newman had long reoognized that 
rea90nil~ i8 departmental, and had mentioned this fact in a sermon in 1840. 
(Newman, Oxford Sermons, 259-260). 
52 .!!A, 271. 
5~ Ct. ~., 271-272. 
54 I bid. t 272. 
-55 Newman, Oxford Sermons, xiii-xiv. 
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Besides the relatione of' similarity between the Illative 3ense and 
phronesis, Newman aleo held some type of' real connection between theee two 
powers .1e ha ve already seen that prudence is a part of' any non-abstract 
proof' and is the standard of' certitude in concrete matter.56 In a letter 
to II .,;ilberf'orce in the summer of 1868, Newman is more explicit about the 
oonneotion of phronesis with reasoning and certitude: 
1 think it is phroneais which tells when to discard the logical 
imperfection and to assent to the conclusion which ought to be 
drawn in order to demonstration but is not guite. No syllogism 
can prove to me that Nature is uniform -- but the argument 1s 80 
strong, though not demonstrative, that 1 should not be Phronimoe 
but a fool, to doubt.51 
This letter shows the identif'ication of a function of phroneeis with a 
function of the Illative Sense;58 this function i8 to judge when a con-
elusion that is not demonstrated should receive an assent. 
We now coree t~ the question of' the range of' the Illative Sense. Newman 
says that this power attends the whole course of concrete reasoning, from 
antecedents to consequents, at the start, couree, and conclusion of the 
inquiry.59 In its application to a specific case the Illative Sense at the 
beginning acts on the statement of the case. "Thi8 depends on the particular 
aspect under which we view a subject, that ia, on the abstraction which forme 
56 QA, 241-
57 Ward • .ill!, 248-249. 'liard pointe out that this letter was written 
at the time that Newman had nearly finished the first draft of the Grammar 
..2! Assent. 
58 The Illative Senee hae other functions beSides this one, a8 will 
be seen in the following consideration of its range. 
59 QA, 214, 215. 
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our representative notion of what it is. n60 In other words, the statement of 
the case i8 the peculiar and personal way in which our Illative Sense views 
the concrete matter w~ich is to be investigated. Thus in regard to the invest-
igation of the physical world, the case could be stated as concerning a series 
of final causes or a series of initial (efficient) causes.6l 30metimes a oase 
may be stated in a simpler and more intelligible manner than it had been pre-
vi ously, because of the discovery of a new aspect of the case. However, such 
62 
a new aspect may be discovered to be unreal. Newman exemplifies the different 
ways in which 4ifferent people view things by reference to how differently 
people will interpret lines, colors, lettere of the alphabet, or family like-
neeses: ~.&., the same curved line will be taken by some people as concave 
and by othere ae convex.6, In intellectual questions about concrete matters, 
p",rsonal factors are even more likely to influence our statement of' the case 
to be investigated. It is the Illative Sense which does this work of stating 
the case. 
Further, the IllativeSenee is responsible for the "implicit assumption 
of definite propositions in the first start of a course of reasoning, and the 
64 
arbitrary exclusion of others. 1I As always, this work of the Illative Sense 
60 
..!.lli., 282 • 
61 Of. lli.!!. 
62 Of. !ill., 28~. 
6) lill,. , 28" 284. 
64 I bid. , 285. 
is personal. The action of the Illative Sense on first principles is extreme-
ly important. Newman says that assumptions, principles, tastes and opinions, 
all of which are of a personal character, are half the battle in inference.65 
To assume that we have no right to make any assumptions and that we must begin 
with a universal doubt, is the greatest of assumptions; and to forbid assumpt-
ions universally is to forbid this one also.66 Even our nature and our method 
of reasoning are assumptions;67 it is up to the personal action of the Illative 
3ense to decide what assumptions are the correct ones to be made at the start 
of any course of reasoning in concrete matter. 
Yet another function of the Illative Sense is to act on the arguments 
by which the question is to be answered and on the determination of the 
conclusion. Some of the arguments advanced as part of the solution of the 
case are what Newman calls antecedent reasons. Antecedent reasons are prob-
abilities or arguments which we bring with us to an investigation even before 
we start inves~igating. They amount to prejudgments about the facts of the 
Oase, are in great measure made by ourselves, and belong to our personal 
68 
character. Such antecedent reasons can be good or bad depending on the 
nature of the case and on our character. Newman says that anteoedent reaeon-
ing is safe when it is negative; ~.&., the notorious bravery of Alexander the 
65 .!..Ell., 274. 
66 .!..Ell., 286 • 
67 .!..Ell. 
68 ~., 289. 
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Great is an antecedent reason \~hich would justify us in rejecting any charge 
of cowardice against him.69 However, our knowledge of his bravery does not 
enable us to perform an act of positive antecedent reasoning in order to con-
clude that on a particular occasion he placed a particular act ot bravery.IO 
It is the function of the Illative Sanee to judge on the value of antecedent 
reasons; this function, like any other function of the Illative Sense, is 
exercised in a personal manner according to the individual Illative Sense. 
Finally, the Illative Sense is the principle of the judging and accumu-
lating of probabilities or arguments, and of discerning the convergence of the 
probabilities toward a conclusion. Newman refers to this method ot procedure 
of the Illative Senee in coming to a conclusion as "the elementary principle 
of that mathematical calculus of modern times. n71 
The Illative Sense operates throughout the entire course of reasoning on 
concrete matter, from beginning to end. Since all of this work of the Illative 
Sense i8 done in a personal manner, it does not provide a common measure be-
tween minds;72 a strictly personal action cannot be communicated in exact 
common measure to another person in the manner that abstractions can be 
communicated. 
It the Illative Sense is to be the ultimate test of the validity of 
69 Ibid. 
70 Of. ll!.2.. 
71 Ibid., 273. 
72 Of. ll!.2.., 275. 
inference· in concrete matter, its credentials for such a position must be 
examined. Newman's starting point in showing the validity of the Illative 
Sense is that we must accept the facts ot nature. 
If I may not assume that I eXist, and in a particular way, that i8, 
with a particular mental constitution, I have nothing to speculate 
about, and had better let speculation alone. Such a8 I am, it 1s 
my all; this is my essential stand-point, and must be taken for 
granted; otherwise, thought is but an idle amusement, not worth 
the trouble • • • • I cannot think, reflect, or judge about rey 
being, without st9rting from the very point which I aim at conclud-
ing. It is enough for the proof of the value and authority of any 
function which I possess, to be able to pronounce that it is natural. 7; 
Newman74 continues his argwnent for the Illative Sense by saying that what is 
natural to a being cannot be considered as a fault of that being. The prin-
ciple of vitalityof' every being keeps the being as one whole with no warring 
parts. Since other beings find their good in the use of their particular 
ratures, there is reason for anticipating that to use duly our own nature 
~s our interest as well as our necessity. I"eculiar to man is the fact that 
~e i8 • being of progrea8, this progress is had by his personal effort in the 
~Be of his faculties. The law of man's being is that he be emphatically 
~elt-made. This law of progress is carried out by means of the acquisition 
,r knowledge, of which inference and assent are the immediate instruments. 
Ie appeal to man as a fact to find out the law ot his mind in regard to the 
~aculty of inference. Pacta make us confess that there is no ultimata test 
t truth besides the testimony borne to truth by the mind itself, in regard 
o concrete conclusions. This situation is inevitable for man. His progres8 
7~ ~.J 26~, 264. 
74 This argument is from ~., 264-267. 
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is a living growth, not a mechanical movement, and the instruments of his 
growth are mental aots and not formulae or language. All that we can do is 
to take man and hie powers as we find them. Since we know that all creation 
is the expression of God's will, we may substitute for a resignation to man's 
destiny and nature, a cheerful concurrence in an overruling Providence, and 
securely take our faculties as we find them. The theory of the Illative ~ense 
fits in with man's powers as we find them and with his growth theough mental 
aots rather than by formulae of language. 
Newman explicitly rejeots the position that man has faith in his reason-
ing power (!.~., Newman holds that man knows the validity of his reasoning 
power; its validity is not something in which man has a weakly-baaed trust.): 
t1but of all these improprieties, none is so great as to say I have faith in 
consciousness, and in reason or reasoning, for reasoning is the very breath of 
my existence, for by it I know that I exist. n75 
The end result which man achieves after the work of the Illative 30nse in 
76 informal inference may be oalled moral certitude. Certitude is an assent, 
rather than an inference; but if the person by nis Illative Sense sees that 
the probabilities 80 indicate the conclusion that he would be a fool not to 
assent to the conclusion, he will normally assent to the conclusion and have 
75 This is from an unpublished manuscript of Newman's (It;S -A.46.,) which 
wae written in 1859. It has recently been published in Boekraad and 'rristram, 
~ Argument from Consciene~ 12 ~ Exietence of Q..Qg, according 12 i. II. Newman, 
Louvain, 1961, 106, and also in J. Colline, Philosophical i{eadinge !!! Cardinal 
Newman, Chicago, 1961, 194. 
76. .QA, 242. On the same page Newman says that he generally avoids 
using the word moral in relation to oertitude and evidence because it has a 
vague meaning. 
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moral certitude about it. Newman eays that moral certitude is all that we can 
attain not only in ethical and spiritual matters but also in terrestrial and 
cosmical queetions.77 Informal inference givee a moral demonstration which 
leade toward moral certitude. Newman made the following analogy in order to 
clarity the nature ot moral demonstration: 
An iron rod represents mathematical or .trict demonstration; a 
cable represents moral demonstration, which is an assemblage of 
probabilities, .eparately insufficient for certainty, but, when 
put together, irrefragable. A man who said "I cannot trU8t a 
cable, 1 must have an iron bar~ would in certain given ca •• s, 
be irrational and unreasonable: -- eo too is a man who says I 
must have a rigid gemonstration, not a moral demonstration, of 
religioue truth. 7 
We have coneidered the nature of informal inference and it. principle, 
the Illative Sense, in this chapter. We have .een that informal interence ie 
a cumulation of independent probabilities in concrete matter which converge 
toward a conclUSion; thie cumUlation i8 carried on by the Illative Jenee, and 
the entire process of reasoning is influenced by personal elements. It now 
remains for us to learn the relation of the process of informal inference 
to formal and natural inference. 
First we shall consider the relation ot informal inference to formal in-
ference. Newman eays that informal interence Ildees not supersede the logical 
form of inference, but ie one and the 8ame with it; only it 18 no longer an 
77 .!..E.!!. ;ia should keep in mind that Newman is speaking about questions 
regarding concrete matters in these fields. 
78 Letter of Newman'" to Canon \4alker, July 6, 1864. quoted in 'hard, 
.ill.!, II, 4,. 
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abstraction, but carried out into the realities of life. H79 He also says 
that informal inference, ·'acting through them~.!.., formal processes of in-
ferenceJreaohes to conclusions beyond and above them. nBO Informal inference 
81 
works "not indeed to the exclusion, but as the supplement of logic." These 
statements indicate that informal inference ie not completely separated from 
formal inference, but rather works both through and beyond it. \'ihereas formal 
inference cannot reach the concrete at all, informal inference, working 
through formal inference, can go beyond formal inference and indicate concrete 
faote in its conolusions so that we can aesent with certitude to the conclu-
sions. Formal inference aids informal inference by keeping the mind from 
running wild,82 and by providing the many other aids which were mentioned in 
the chapter on formal inference.83 Newman is not speaking exactly when he says 
that informal inference is the "supplement of logic. ,,84 It is rather formal 
inferenoe which is a supplement to informal; Newman states that the relation 
of formal inference to informal 1s analogous to the relation of a sketch to a 
portrait.85 As a sketch shows the rough outlines of a portrait in order that 
79 QA, 222. 
80 ll!2.. , 240. 
81 ~., 241. 
82 ~., 200. 
83 Of. this thesis, 13-14. 
84 ~, 219. 
85 Ibid., 241. 
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a well ordered portrait might be obtained, so formal inference shows the 
rough outlines of thought and reaeoning, in order that we might have a well 
ordered :ceaeoning process. Formal inference is usetul, butllonly in subord-
ination to a higher logic," 86 i.e., in concrete reasoning, formal inference 
is usetul only in subordination to intormal inference. 
The relation ot informal inference and natural inference is not treated 
explicitly by Newman. That there is a cloae connection between these two 
types of inference is shown by the similarities of the two: both are the work 
ot the Illative Sense and departmental; both are personal, depending upon the 
moral character and intellectual skill and experience of the individual; both 
deal with concrete evidence and arrive at concrete conclusions. Informal 
inferenoe also partakes ot the implicitness of natural inference to a certain 
extent; some of the probabilities may be grasped in an implicit manner, and 
the summing up ot the converging probabilities into the conclusion is an 
unwritten summing up, in which the premisses and conolusion are seen as a 
whole. 
Despite theee similarities, informal and natural inference are distinct. 
The main ditference between the two is the tact that the process itself ot 
natural interence is entirely unconscious; the man using natural inference 
cannot say how he arrived at his conolusion. Informal inference on the 
86 Ibid., 2,0. 
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contrary is not BO unconsoious: the converging probabilities can be enumer-
ated. Informal interence's explicitness is also shown by the fact that it 
has use for formal inference, whereas natural inference is eo implicit 
that it has no use at all for formal inference. 
CHAPTER V. 
SUMY~RY AND EVALUATION. 
Newman's purpose in his theory of reasoning in the Grammar ~ Assent 
wae to discuss the process by which we arrive at concrete and individual 
conclusions. In his effort to find the reasoning process which would en-
able us to know the concrete and individual, Newman first considers formal 
inference. Formal inference is reasoning as it is marked out by words, 
propositions and syllogisms. The scientific form of formal inference is 
logic. Although Newman admits many uses of formal inference, he maintains 
that it has serious inadequacies, eSp'cially in regard to concrete matter. 
Formal inference must aesume some premisses; it is unable to prove all its 
premieses. Formal inference is unable to reach the concrete and individual 
in its conclusions because it is carried on by means of abstractions. Formal 
inference is unable to do full justice in expressing thought since formal in-
terence is verbal, and thought exceeds the merely verbal. 
Natural inference, according to Newman, ie the apprehension of a conclu-
sion without consciousness of the process, and sometimes even of the anteced-
ents, which lead to the conclusion. Natural inference proceeds from the con-
crete to the concrete; it does not use words. Informal inference is the 
cumulation of probabilities which converge toward a concrete conclusion. The 
conclusion is the limit toward which these probabilities tend; they do not 
actually touch the conclusion logically, but they show that the conclusion is 
~,. 
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inevitable. Some conclusions of informal inference can be attained only if 
certain personal elements (concerning moral character, and skill and exper-
ience in the subject-matter) are present in the reasoner. Informal inference 
has somewhat of a resemblance to natural inference in that some of its 
premisses may be implicit and its antecedents and conclusion may be grasped 
as a whole, and to a certain extent it is non-verbal. 
The Illative Sense is the principle of the supra-logical reasoning of 
both natural and informal inference. It operates throughout the entire 
course of concrete reasoning, from the statement of the case and acceptance 
of first principles, to the judging of arguments and the judgment about the 
conclusion. It is the ultimate norm of truth in reasoning on concrete 
matters. Its sanction is found in the fact that man is a personal and 
growing being, and the Illative Sense fits in with personal growth through 
reasoning. The Illative Sense is departmental; therefore, both natural and 
informal inference tend to be attached to particular subject-matters accord-
ing to the individual's aptitudes. Since the process of natural inference 
is completely unconscious, it has no use for formal inference. Informal 
inference however is able to use formal inference, and works through and 
beyond it. 
The first task of this evaluation of Newman's reasoning theory is to 
locate this theory in regard to its own position as a body of knowledge with-
in the field of philosophy. There is some difficulty in classifying Newman's 
reasoning theory within anyone of the traditional divisions of philosophy. 
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As reasoning theory, one would expect that it would tall within logic; if 
logic is the science that studies mental operations in order that they may 
be directed toward truth, any theory that purports to aid reasoning in attain-
1 ing truth is a part of logic. Therefore, there is good reason for eonsider-
ing Newman's reasoning theory to pertain to logic since it does study mental 
operations in order that they may be directed toward truth. However, Newman 
himself took logic to be the scientific form of what he called formal infer-
ence, and he conSidered his theory of natural and informal inference to be 
above the logical. What Newman called logic was really the tormal logic of 
reasoning; this is concerned with the formal structures of reasoning as they 
are manifested by language structures. Material logic, which might prevent 
formal logic from becoming overly abstracted from reality, was neglected in 
2 Newman's age. Because of this neglect, logic became practically synonomous 
with formal logic; even in our day, logic is often considered only in its 
formal aspect; espeCially in symbolic logic. Since Newman's theory of 
reasoning contains 80 much beyond the formal aspects of reasoning, in regard 
to both the objeots on whioh we reason and the subject who reasone, it might 
be misleading to classify his theory as logic. Nevertheless there is some 
1 We are here prescinding from the question of the validity or non-
validity of such a theory; true logic and false logic both pertain to the 
field of logic. 
2 "Indeed, for some three hundred years, no less, prior to the advent 
ot this newer logic, the schools of Europe had apparently committed them-
selves to presenting an empty husk of logic, which they called Aristotelian, • 
• • • " (Henry 5. Veatch, Intentional LogiC, New Haven, 1952, 'jcf. also 
,96, note 2, on the negleot ot material logic). 
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reason for calling it logic, since it does give a method and other advice (e.g. 
the method of convergir~ probabilities, the recommendations to consider person-
81 factors required for various reasoning processes, and the need for familiar-
ity with the subject-matter) in order that the mind may be directed to truth. 
Newman himself speake of a "higher logio n above verbal argumentation.~ 
Another possible classification for Newman's reasoning theory is episte-
mology. Dessain,4 however, holds that Newman is not dealing with epistemology 
in the Grammar ~ Assent. Although Newman's main purpose in the Grammar ~ 
Assent was not epistemological, he does treat an epistemological problem in a 
brief way. Newman does decide that his theory of the Illative Sense is valid 
because it explains the living growth of man through knowing and reasoning. 
He also judges from the nature of concrete matter and from the nature of the 
human mind, that certitude may arise from arguments that are in their letter 
probabilities. Therefore, Newman does hold that man oan know concrete ex-
ternal reality. Newman, however, does not have an epistemology in the usual 
sense of the word. He does not argue to a theory of what the mind knows, as 
does Kant in his Critique £! ~ Reason, or Hegel in his Phenomenology of 
~. He rather takes for granted that the mind does know reality in the 
moderate realist sense of reality. Any development of epistemology would 
seem to be impossible for Newman since he held that in any criticism of our 
4. o. S. Dessain, IIOardinal Newman on the Theory and Practice of 
knowledge,1I Downside Review, 75 (1957), 7. 
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minds we must start at the very point at which we hope to end. His episte-
mology amounts to a practical attitude: use your human nature as you find it; 
accept natural and informal inference because they are descriptive of the 
living, personal growth of a human nature in knowledge. 
Most of Newman's theory of reasoning pertains to the field of rational 
psychology or philosophy of man. Newman's psychology is greatly to be pre-
ferred to much modern psychology which evolves its theories within analogical 
models of man, thereby saying nothing directly of man; Newman's theory, on 
the contrary, is a desoriptive theory of man's reasoning; he described the 
observable facts of man's reasoning processes in concrete matter, and then 
he points out the essential factors within these processes, and then he adds 
his hypothesis of the Illa~ive Sense to explain these facts. Instead of 
attempting to isolate his reasoning theory from the philosophy of the human 
person, as is done in logic, Newman tries to include his reasoning theory 
~ithin the philosophical position that man is a self-making personal unity 
that grows through acquiring knowledge. 
Newman's theory of reasoning shows many insights into the nature of man's 
reasoning and the nature of man himself. Hie doctrine of the wholeness or 
simplicity of natural inference indicates an important insight into the oper-
ation of the human mind. The most valuable of Newman's inSights into the 
nature of reasoning and of man concern the personal and non-verbal aspects 
of reasoning. His doctrine that moral character and skill and experience 
affect reasoning ability, and that what 18 a proof to one person will be 
nadequate for another, shows the unity of the human person and the mutual 
~. 
interaction of the various parts of the person. His theory that concrete 
reaeoning goes beyond the merely verbal level of thought indicates more about 
the nature of man's mind. His realization that reasoning to concrete conclu-
sions requires a different method from that of reasoning to non-concrete con-
clusions, and his theory of informal inference are also important for an 
understanding of how man's mind operates. The Illative Sense also represents 
a contribution to psychology. And all of Newman's reasoning theory fits in 
with his doctrine that man is selt-creating and grows through acquiring know-
ledge in a living way. 
Although Newman does present a "higher logic" with methods and advice for 
correct reasoning, his reasoning theory should be considered primarily ae a 
contribution to the philosophy of man: his insights are primarily into the 
nature of manls mental operations and secondarily into the means for correctly 
guiding these operations. 
Since Newmanls theory of reasoning is primarily part of a philosophy of 
man that is based on observation, it is fitting that our primary evaluation 
of it be based on a consideration of how accurately Newman does describe the 
reality of reasoning. First we shall consider natural inference. Our decision 
about the accuracy of Newman's description of the reality of reasoning will 
depend upon the answers to these questions: Does reasoning sometimes occur 
as the apparently immediate grasping of a conclusion, without awareness of 
the antecedents? Can we reason directly from unconscious concrete antecedents 
to a concrete conclUSion, without using words as mediums of our reasoning? 
One example that Newman gives of natW"al inference concel'll. physicians 
who excEl 1 in the diagnosis of complaints. .'e should study this example in 
order to learn whether it ahaws (a) an immediate grasp of a conclusion while 
the process leading to the conclusion,and maybe even the antecedent.,are 
unconscious; (b) reaBoning trom concrete to concrete, without words aa a 
mediUIII. 
Newman saya that some physicians excel in the diagnosis ot complainte 
even though they may be unable to detend their diagnoaie against that ot 
another physician. In such a ca8e the physician would perceive (we should 
not restrict "perceive" to the merely sensible level, but rather include a180 
intellectual perception) the over-all physical state of the person. He would 
proceed trom thi8 perception to his diagnosie, which 18 hi_ conclusion. let 
he c!nnot detend his diagnosis against other physicians. This tact indicatea 
that he was unconacious ot the prooess by which he arrived at hi. conclusion; 
had he known the proceas, it would serve ae his detenee. .Aho it appear I 
that he proceeded trom concrete to concrete. He perceived the concrete tact 
ot the person's physical condition and then judged what was wrong with the 
person, another concrete tact. It eeems obvious that there were no worde 
involved a8 media ot arriving at the conclusion; it worda were media in hia 
procesl ot reasoning, he could use these words to detend his conclusion 
against other physicians. 
Another of Newmanls examples ot natW"al inference concerns Napoleon's 
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conclusions in military matters, which appeared as immediate judgments.5 If 
the enemy's troops were scattered, Napoleon knew at once how long it would 
take them to concentrate and how many hours must elapse before they could 
attack. In other words, Napoleon perceived the scattered .tate of the enemy 
(this perception is the concrete and non-verbal antecedent), and judged spon-
taneouely a. to how long it would take them to concentrate for attack. This 
judgment was based on hie peroeption of the scattered state of the enemy. He 
wa. not aware of an, reasoning process leading from his perception of the 
scattered state of the enemy to his judgment of how long it would take them to 
concentrate, because this judgment immedi!tely followed hi_ perception. Per-
haps he wa. eyen unconscious of the fact that hi. judgment about the time 
needed for the concentration of the enemy was based on hi_ perception of 
their scattered state. Thi. latter unconsoiousnes8 however seems very im-
probable. At any rate it is not absolutely :neceesary for natural inference. 
The essential element or natural interence is that the procese from antecedent 
to conclusion be unconscious, and in this example it appears such; it aleo 
appears that the reasoning doee proceed from concrete to concrete, from the 
scattered condItion of the enemy to the length of time required for them to 
concentrate. There is no yerbal medium; Napoleon could proceed immediately 
trom the perceptIon or the concrete IItuation to a judgment on the concrete 
tact or how long concentration will take. 
Newman's doctrine of natural inference not only agre.s with tacte but allo 
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represents a good insight into facts. kany examples of this 8pontaneous 
reasoning can be found in everybody's life; ~.& .• we directly conolude that 
a person i8 not reeling well from our percept10n of hie appearance, or we 
judge that a person i8 angry at ue from our perception or hie appearance. 
~ven though Newman has described in natural inference a phenomenon of which 
we should be aware, such e form of interence gives little insight into !h! way 
£1 which we reach concrete conclusions. Newman's theory ot natural inference 
merely tells us that we reach concrete conclusione and that we do ao by an 
unconscious and non-verbal power of our mind; it providea no explanation of 
these facte. Nevertheless it doe. represent an accurate descript10n of the 
reality of reasoning. 
Next, we must evaluate informal inference in regard to its acouracy a. a 
description of the reality of rea.oning. The question which we must answer 
here 1s this: can and do men arrive sometimes at concrete conclusions by means 
of non-demonstrative arguments (1.e., II probabil1tiee") which converge toward a 
conclusion and indicate that the conclusion must be true? 
The concrete conclusion "Great Britain is an reland," ie given by Newman 
6 
as an example of a conclusion that we hold by an informal inference, Men 
hold this conclusion even though we do not have the highe8t kind of proof 
possible, "Those who have oiroumnavigated the Island have a right to b~ oer-
tain: have we ever ourselves even fallen in with anyone who has'l"7 Here are 
the reasons Newman gives for the average man'. belief that Great Britain is 
6 .ll!1., 22,-225. 
7 llli., 224. 
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an island: 
We have been so taught in our childhood, and it is so in all the 
maps; next, we have never heard it contradicted or questioned; on 
the contrary, everyone whom we have heard speak on the subject of 
Great Britain, every book we nave read, invariably took it for 
granted; our whole national history, the routine transactions and 
current events of the country, our social and cammercial system, 
our political relations with foreigners, imply it in one way or 
another. Numberless facts, or what we consider facts, rest on the 
truth of it; no received facts rests on its being otherwise. If 
there is anywhere a junction between us and the continent, where 
is it? and how do we know it? is it in the north or in the south? 
There is a manifest reductio ad absurdum attached to the notion 
that we can be deceived on suCh a point as this. 8 
No one of these arguments is a demonstration of the fact that Great 
Britain is an ieland. Yet each one of them does point toward the conclusion 
that Great Britain is an island. If we take all of them together we still 
would not have a logical den1onstration that Great Britain is an island, but 
the indications of this fact converge so strongly toward this conclusion that 
only a fool would not accept this conclusion. Of course, we might object to 
Newman that we hold that Great Britain is an ieland on the basis of a human 
faith which we have not investigated. This may be true for some or many in-
dividuals, but could not such a person investigate the indications of the 
insularity of Great Britain and by means of an informal inference arrive at a 
reasonable certitude that Great Britain is an island? There is no apparent 
reason for not accepting Newman1s theory of informal inference as descriptive 
of a method by which one could arrive at a concrete concluBion, and it appears 
to the author of this thesis as though this method is often used. 
8 Ibid. 
Ne~an proposed hie theory of reasoning as the solution to the problem 
of three inadequacies of formal inference in regard to concrete conclusions. 
These inadequacies are (1) the inability to prove all of its premisses and 
assumptions, (2) the inability to reach the concrete and individual, and (') 
the insufficiency of verbal logic in representing the su~ety of the mind. In 
our evaluation of Newman's reasoning theory we should consider whether these 
inadequacies are really present in formal inference, and whether informal in-
ference overcomes these inadequacies. 
(1) First we shall consider the inability of formal inference to prove 
all of its premisses and assumptions. This inability seems to be a necessary 
factor within syllogistic reasoning such as formal inference. Before such 
reasoning can be carried on, there must be two premisses which can be compared 
in the syllogism. If these two premisses are proved in two other syllogisms, 
these other syllogisms contain a total of four premisses; somewhere there must 
be a beginning to this series of syllogisms, and there, premisses will be 
found, which are not proved syllogistically. Aristotle would tend toward a-
greeing with Newman on this first inadequacy of formal inference, although it 
appears that he would require a smaller number of undemonstrable principles of 
reasoning: II For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolute 
'. 1y everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be 
no demonstration) .,,9 
9 Aristotle, M.etaphyeics, -i/orke .£! Aristot.le, trans. by 'rl. D. ~ioss, 
VIII, Oxford, 1928, bk. Q, ch. 4, 1006a9. 
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It is even more obvious that assumptions of a personal character or from local 
customs or ideas of the age, are not prowed by formal inference or formal 
logic; formal logic works at the comparison of premisses to learn what conclu-
sion is justified from given premisses; it does not investigate or judge about 
assumptions of the reasoner. 'rherefore, it must be admitted that ~~ewman is 
orrect in holding that formal inference is unable to prove all of its prem-
sses and assumptions. 
The problem next to be solved is whether informal inference is able to 
vercome the inability of formal inference to prove its premisses and as sump-
ions. Informal inference, in fact, must begin with some assumptions; acoord-
ng to Newman even our nature and our way of reasoning are assumptions. Also, 
n any partioular informal inference, there must be assumptions made as to 
irst principles, and there also must be assumptions of a personal nature. 
nformal inference is no more able to prove these assumptions than is formal 
nference. Newman's solution to thiB difficulty is his Illative 3enae, which 
udges the validity of the assumptions to be used in informal inference. In 
words, the personal aotion of one's mind, working in accord with one's 
oral character and experience in the particular subject matter, judges 
hether assumptions are true or false. 
This solution to the inability of formal inference to prove its premisses 
nvites two objections: (A) the Illative Sense may be in error in its judgment 
bout the assumptions; (J) formal inference may use the Illative Sense in the 
ame manner as does informal inference, in order to judge its premisses. The 
irst objection must be allowed to stand as valid. Since everyone has an 
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Illative Senee (at least the first aspeot of the Illative Senee, even though the 
seoond aspect, of skill and experience in the subjeot-matter may be missing) and 
sinoe people do make errors in assumptions for concrete reasonings, we may safe-
ly conclude that the Illative Sense can err about assumptions. Newman, himself 
mentions a case in which an Illative Sense erredjn regard to assumptions. 10 
Newman's position is not that every Illative Sense is infallible, but rather 
that the Illative Senee, through growth in moral character, skill and experience 
becomes a more and more reliable judge, and that one with "an honest purpose 
11 
and fair talents" will make his way to the truth. Although the Illative 
Sense neither proves assumptions nor is always infallible about them, it still 
remains our only way of judging them, and an Illative Sense in its full meaning, 
one which has been perfected through experience and is joined with good moral 
character and natural ability, is to be fully trusted in its judgments about 
assumptions and principles of reasoning. 'r'ithout such a sense, how could man 
~row in his knowledge? 
The second objection, that formal inference could use the Illative Sense, 
as informal inference does, to judge its premisses, oannot be allowed as valid 
if one accepts Newman's view of formal inference. Formal inferenoe, as present-
ed by Newman, is a process which is isolated from the living action of the mind. 
It appears that the rationalists who would hold such a view of reasoning as 
desoribed in Newman's formal inference must have objectified reasoning so much 
10 QA, 289. 
11 .!,2g., 287. 
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that it became strictly a syllogistic process on paper, and was cut off from 
the good judgment of the mind. Such an objectified process of reasoning would 
therefore be unable to receive help from the Illative Sense because the 111a-
tive 3ense does not work syllogistically, nor can all of its work be written 
down, since some of it is non-verbal. Whether or not such a completely object-
ified view of reasoning was held, Newman is making a point against those who 
stressed logical inference since this type of inference ~ itself is unable to 
prove or judge its premisses; it was unwise of rationalists to misplace effort 
on logical inference when the effort should be spent on an investigation of 
assumptions. 
(2) The second inadequacy of formal inference according to Newman is its 
inability to reach the concrete and individual. aecause of this pOSition, 
Newman has often been accused of nominalism or conceptualism. 12 The only way 
to solve the problems raised by this position is to discover first of all what 
concrete and individual or concrete meant to Newman. The possible meaning of 
these terms is not as unique ae might be thought at fir,et sight; in fact, there 
are several types of the concrete, each of which might be called concrete. 
Newman himself does not explicitly state the meaning of the concrete, except 
for one footnote in which he states that what he calls the concrete, Aristotle 
12 Cf. Charles F. Harrold, ~ Henry Newman,London, 1945, 40" note 5, 
for references to sources accusing Newman of Nominalism. Many authors state 
that Newman was not concerned with metaphysics and did not intend to enter 
the famous controversy about universals (e.g., TheiS, "Einfahrung," Newman 
Studien, II, 194; Zeno, ~ Heney Newman, 7'-74; Deesain, "Newman on 
Knowledge," Downside Review, 75 1957), 18). 
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oalled the contingent.15 The examples which Newman uses to illustrate concrete 
conclusions are most useful in enabling one to decide what concrete meant to 
Newman. First of all, let us consider a division of various types of the ~­
crete based on the relation of the concrete to a universal. There are some 
concrete things which are determinable~merely because they are contained within 
the extension of a universal, e.g., John is a social being beoause be is a man 
and all men are social beings. In this example, social being, signifying that 
one has a radical aptitude and tendency toward living in society, can be in-
ferred from the faot that one is a man, because it is part of the nature of man 
that it have a radical aptitude and tendency toward living in society. 
Besides this one type of the concrete, which is determinable by universal, 
the other types of the concrete are not determinable by universals by them-
selves. These typos of the concrete include the following: (1) the fact of 
existence, e.g., Great Britain exists; (2) the fact of a mode of existence in 
no way contained under a universal, e.g., Great Britain is an island; (5) a 
fact which appears to be contained under a universal physical law, but since 
there could be exception to the physical law, is not absolutely determined by 
the physical law, e.g., the sun will rise tomorrow; (4) a fact which appears 
to be contained under a universal "moral" law, but which is not absolutely 
determined by the "moral" law since there can be exception to the 'Imoralll law 
through man's free acts; such a fact would be, e.g., John will act socially in 
this particular instance. None of these four types of the concrete can be 
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determined by means of a universal; it appears that the best way in which 
these types of the concrete can be designated as a group i8 to say that they 
pertain to the singular as Singular. 
It will be seen by an examination of the examples of what Newman called 
the concrete or the concrete and individual, that none of them refer to the 
concrete in the sense of a concrete radical aptitude and tendency existing in 
a nature. All of hie examples refer rather to the concrete in the latter four 
senses mentioned above, i.e., the concrete which is not determinable by univer-
sals. Therefore, in the Grammar ]! Assent, concrete refers to facts that per-
tain to the Singular ~ Singular. 
We are now able to judge with facility about the second inadequacy of 
formal inference, its inability to reach the concrete and individual. Formal 
inference for Newman is syllogistic inference conducted by means of universals. 
Universals, however, cannot enable us to determine facte about the singular as 
Singular; such facte are independent of universals. Therefore, formal infer-
ence and its universals are unable to reach the concrete (which for Newman 
signifies facts about the Singular as singular). 
The charge that Newman is a namir~list cannot be based on the fact that 
he held that universals are unable to determine facts about the Singular as 
singular; moderate realists also maintain that universals cannot enable us to 
determine facts about the Singular as singular. Newman however does make 
statemente in the Grammar of Assent which seems to indicate nominalism: e.g., 
"iihat is called a universal is only a general. u14 This statement, however, i8 
14 Ibid., 212. 
made in a context about attempts to determine the concrete and individual by 
means of a universal, and its meaning could be taken to be: a universal which 
is used in an attempt to determine a CQnerete conclusion, is only a general. 
In other words, Newman was concerned only with the attainment of concrete con-
clusions; universals used to determine such conclusions cannot be ba~ed ~erely 
on the nature of man (e.g.) eince the nature of man tells us nothing about 
the singular as singular; w~' can however make statistical sUllllIlaries about 
singulars and apply such data to other singulars; such statistical summaries 
about singulars are "generals.1\ 
That Newman did not hold nominalism is also indicated by many statdmcnts 
in the Grammar of Assent in which he speake of true universals that are not 
generals. He says that, ~Ieven one act 01" cruelty, ingratitude, generosity, or 
justice, reveals to us at once intensive the immutable distinction between 
15 those qualities and their contraries. U He speaks of original forms of think-
ing "connatural with our mindsil and of t,he "conditions of' hwnan naturellj he 
also mentions the duty of resignation to the ulaws of my nature,n l 6 He holds 
that the umind is made for truth!!, and he speaks of errorz:s which belonE; to the 
individual and not to his nature. l7 All of theee 3tatementsindioate that 
Newman held some Bort of true universal which has its basis in reality. 
15 ll!i., 50. 
16 ~., 49, 205, 264; cf. also 6. 
16 ~., 167 and 6. 
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Now that we have finished discussing the problem of the inadequacy of 
formal inference to reach the concrete, we will consider whether informal in-
ference does not experience the 8ame difficulty in its attempt to reach the 
ooncrete. Newman himself holds that the probabilities of informal inference 
converge toward a conclusion, but they do not touoh the conclusion: as a reg-
ular polygon inscribed in a circle tends to become that circle as its aidea 
are continually diminished, so also the cumulation of probabilities approaches 
the conclusion more nearly than any assignable difference, yet does not touch 
it logically. Therefore, it appears that informal inference is also unable to 
reach the concrete. However, there is a difference in the ways in which formal 
and informal interence reach conclusions; formal interence, by means of general 
terms, has only one indication that its concrete conclusion is true; this indi-
cation is that the concrete tact should be included within the scope of the 
general term. On the other hand, intormal inference has many converging in-
dicationa of the truth of the concrete conclusion. The single indication of 
formal inference of the truth of a concrete conclusion is not sufficient to 
make us assent to it, but the many indications of informal inference may so 
reinforce one another that we are able to see that the concrete conclusion 
cannot be false, and we would be imprudent not to assent to it. In this way 
informal inference is able to reach the concrete; even though it does not 
logically include the concrete conclusion within its premiasea, it nevertheless 
indicates the conclusion so strongly that the human mind in the right condition 
recognizes an obligation to assent to the conclusion. 
The objection was placed againat Newman that his theory ot informal 
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inference violated the fundamental rule that the conclusion cannot be stronger 
18 than the prem1ues; in informal interence the conclusion may be certain even 
though the premisses are probable. Such an objection presuppose. an unaware-
ness of the meanings of probable and certain for Newman in this context. The 
probable in regard to arguments for a conclusion is opposed not to certain but 
to demonstrative; an argument which does not demonstrate a conclusion may 
nevertheless indicate the conclusion with some degree at probability. A num-
her of independent arguments or facts, each one of which, taken separately, 
probably indicates a conclusion, may, taken as a whole, so indicate the conclu-
sion that a prudent man would be certain of the conclusion. Thie certitude 
about (or certain assent to) the conclusion is a moral certitude and not an 
absolute certitude. Newman said in an unfinished letter to William Froude: 
"We differ in our aense and our use of the word 'certaih'. I use it of minds, 
you of propOSitions • • • I maintain that minds may in my sense be certain of 
conclusions which are uncertain in yours. \1 19 The prudent man recognizes a duty 
to assent to undemon8trated conclu8ions when there is sufficient evidence for 
them. Therefore, there is no conflict between probable premisses and a certain 
conclusion in Newman's theory of informal inference. 
(,) The third inadequacy of formal inference according to Newman concerns 
18 Leslie 3t,phen, "Oardinal Newman's SceptiCism," lh! Nineteenth Century, 
29 (1891), 190, referred to by John F. Oronin, Oardinal Newman: li!! Theory of 
Knowledge; Washington, D.O., 19,5, 77. 
19 Ward,'y:£!, II, ~7-588. 
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the relationship of formal inference, ae verbal, to thought: formal inference, 
as verbal, cannot do full justice to thought. The mind is more vigorous than 
any of itl works, of which language il one. According to Newman's desoription 
of formal inference, it is undoubtedly limited to the level of thought that 
can be verbalized; formal inference is oarried on by meane of universal terms 
within syllogisms. Anything non-verbal would not fit in with the highly ob-
jectified nature of formal inferenoe; the non-verbal bringe in the subjective 
alp8ct of thought, which il out of place in formal reasoning which can be 
objeotively written down in its entirety. It appears that Newman is correct 
in limiting logic to the verbal level of thought. The question remains,how-
ever, as to the ability of informal inference to go beyond the merely verbal 
level of thought and to utilize the power of the mind more fully_ It il 
apparent that there are non-verbal factorl in informal inference. Non-verbal 
tactorl of primary importance in the theory of informal inference are the 
personal qualities of the reasoner. The aoral character, skill and experience 
of the reasoner are not verbal in nature, nor are they communicable to others 
merely b, worde. Yet these personal elements stfect the entire proces8 of in-
formal reterence; because ot such personal elements one person will choose 
correct first principles, another will choose incorrect ones; these personal 
elements affect the way in which one views the case to be conSidered, and the 
judging of t~e various probabilities that make up an informal inference: they 
also affect one'. judgment .s to whether probabilities converge so etrongly 
that the concrete conclusion should receive one's assent. 
Another class ot non-verbal factors in informal inference are implicit 
7'. 
premissea. It seems quite possible that one or two premisses of an informal 
interence remain implicit in the manner of the antecedents of natural inference. 
ror instance, one could reason to the probable date of origin of a piece of 
MUsic on the basis of certain harmonic structures and a certain type of melody, 
and also because of some other quality which one perceive. but is not able to 
state; such reasoning would involve some sort of an implicit and non-verbal 
premiss. This is not to say that such implicit premi •• ee are also entirely 
non-verbalizable. The writer of this thesis cannot see how a premiss could 
be entirely non-verba11zable, nor how such a premiss could ever be spoken 
about if it did exist. 
A third class of non-verbal factors in informal inference concerns the 
matter of h2! the probabilities go about converging on a concrete conclusion. 
A person can state all the arguments of an informal inference and also state 
~ they converge toward a conclusion as a limit, but he cannot state-h2! 
they do so. Each person must look for and see how the convergence takes place 
with his own mind, rather than merely receive a verbal statement of it from 
another. Words are not adequate to stating the comparison of all the arguments 
as a whole with the conclusion. 
This non-verbal aspect of reasoning is very important for Newman's theory 
of reasoning in concrete matters. It is precisely because of this non-verbal 
element in reasoning that we are able to reach concrete and individual con-
clusions. In a non-verbal way we are able to see that the sum total of the 
probabilities of an informal interence so indicate a concrete conolusion that 
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it i& inevitable. By the mere wards of formal interence we could not determine 
the concrete conclusion. By the power of the mind in informal inference which 
works through and beyond words, we can determine a concrete conclusion as the 
limit of converging probabilities (non-demonstrative arguments). A non-verbal 
power of the mind enables us to eee arguments as converging upon a concrete 
conclusion and as indicating that conclusion as their limit. Of course, per-
sonal elemente (e.g., prudence, senee of duty to truth, and experience in the 
subject) will affect the view which the person takes of the unwritten summing 
up of all the arguments. 
Throughout Newman's theory of reasoning there is an emphaeis on the impor-
tance of personal factor.. The personal action of the Illative Sense is re-
sponsible for the statement of the case, the chooeing of first principle., the 
evaluation of arguments, and the judgment aa to the convergence of arguments 
and whether the conclusion merits assent. The problem raised therefore, by the 
whole of Newman's reaeoning theory, 1s whether his theory ia completely subject 
ive, with no regard for the objectivity of truth. If each person ha. hia own 
way of looking at a case, his own first principles, and his own outlook on the 
parts of the proof and their value as a whole, what happens to the objectivity 
of the knowledge obtained by reasoning? There can be no doubt that Newman him-
self held that man can and does obtain objective knowledge of external reaH ty. 
Hie entire reasoning theory Wal developed to explain how we attain conclusions 
about the concrete and individual. He eays, "We reason in order to enlarge our 
knowledge of matters, which do not depend on us for being what they are."20 
20 Q!, 211. 
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The ~uestion still remains, however, as to whether Newman's theory of reasoning 
has stressed personal elements 80 much that it no longer allows the poesibility 
that knowledge be objective. 
It appears that there is no opposition between Newman's etress of personal 
tactors in reasoningaodthe objectivity of knowledge. Newman's stress of the 
personal should be taken as a good attempt at explaining how objective know-
ledge exists within the human person. Any theory of human knowledge and reason-
ing should explain how these exist in the person; otherwise it 1s overlooking 
one ot the mopt obvious tacts about knowledge and reasoning, that they are 
of a 
activities/person. That personal factors ot skill and experience do in fact 
influence reasoning ability must be admitted. ~verybody showe respect for the 
reasoning ability ot competent physicians, engineers, lawyers, or physicists in 
their respective fieldsj such men,have a familiarity and rap~ort with their sub-
ject matter, which were dev.loped through experience. The departmentality ot 
reasoning ability in a person is a recognized fact, and is vell illustrated by 
~ewman'8 reference to the incongruity ot a Newton who could concentrate an army 
¥or battle and a Napoleon who could generalize the principle of gravitation. 
The relation of personal elements of the moral order to concrete reasoning 
is a aore subtle one, but Newman's stress of the moral personal elements in 
reasoning aleo is congruent with our experience. Nobody is convinced of a 
concrete conclUSion that is entirely contrary to his wishes. Since it is the 
person who perceives reality and reasons about it, the quality of that person 
~hould be expected to influence the quality of the perception and reasoning. A 
physiCian who has no sense of duty or intellectual conscientiousness will not 
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reason a8 well as one who i8 conscientious. An enquirer about religion who 
leads a dissolute life will reason differently about it than will a person 
who leads a virtuous life. 
Another charge of subjectivism against Newman i. based on hi. doctrine 
21 
of the Illative 3ense. However, the fact that the Illative Sense is called 
the ultimate test of truth or fal.1ty in concrete rea80nings does not signify 
that Newman has abandoned the objectiv1ty of Knowledge. He i. al.ay. clear 
about the fact that the Illative Sense 1n ita developed state works upon evi-
dence. In other worde, the Illative Sense is the ultimate subjeotive norm of 
truth or falaity in concrete reasonings, but it work. upon objective evidence. 
However, the ability of the Illative Sense to asaimilate the evidence will de-
pend upon the condition of the particular Illative Sense; eome Illative Seneee 
may err because they do not have the required moral, intellectual and exper-
iential attribute. needed to succeed in a particular subject. 
The Illative Sense has value a. an explanatory prinCiple of important 
factors in Newman'. reasoning theory, it indicatea that concrete reasoning is 
a living activity done in a personal and partially non-verbal way. The theory 
of the Illative Sense presents difficulties however. One of these is the fact 
of the two aspects of the Illative 3ense: (1) the concrete rea80ning principle 
in everybody. and (2) the concrete reasoning principle in thoae who have devel-
oped their rea80ning skill through experience, and who have a good moral 
21 cr. Cronin, Newman, 79. 
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charaoter. In most of Newman's development of the theory ot the Illative 
Sense, he speaks only ot the second upect rL it. However, the first. aspect of 
the Illative 3enae must also be admitted since it is the principle of any con-
crete reasoning ( in which everyone indulge.) and Binoe it can err. These t.wo 
aspects easily lead to contusion about Newman's theory .ince he doee not explic-
itly distinguish them. The result 18 that he appear. either to have lett most 
people without an ultimate subjective norm ot trut.h in mo.t tields, because 
they do not have an Illative Senae (in its seoond aspect), or to have given 
everybody 80me sort ot infallibility sinoe everyone has an lllat.lve Sense (in 
it.s first aspect), and it is the ultimate subjective norm of truth. Newman's 
pOSition i. rather that everyone doe. hawe such a subjective norm ot truth, but 
they must work to improve this norm. The mere tact that the Illative Senee ie 
the ultimate subjective norm does ~ require that it be intallible. 
Another ditticulty ooncerning the Illative ienae is its ontological statu •• 
Although Newman speaks ot parallel taoulties to the Illative 3an •• , it ie not a 
taculty in the soholastic Bense ot the term. The Illative Sense pertorms so 
many diveree operations throughout the reasoning process that it could not be 
called a faoulty in the striot scholastic sense. In its tirst aspeot, the 
Illative Sense is the native ability ot the mind tor concrete reasoning. In ita 
second aspeot (the one in which Newman ordinarily uses it) it i_ the souroe ot 
a faoility or .aee in concrete reasoning, and is parallel to phrone8is, sen.e ot 
beauty, sense ot good taate, etc. The Illative Sen.e amounts to an explanatory 
principle by which the many points ot Newman's concrete reasoning theory can b. 
explained. Its ontological reterence pointe are the various aspects of the 
78. 
mindwh~ are involved in concrete reasoning. 
A final question concerns the limite of the application of Newman's 
reasoning theory. Our main criterion of the limite of its use should be the 
limits which he sets to it himself. Unfortunately he does not speak explicitly 
about the limits of hi. theory; this fact ~ight lead one to gather as a first 
impression that there are no limits to the applicability it hi. theory and that 
Newman intends hie theory to be the complete theory of reasoning. Such an im-
pression however would be erroneous. Throughout hie development of his own 
reasoning theory in the Grammar £! Assent, Newman states explicitly and shows 
by his examples that he is concerned with deonerete reaenning", i.e., reason-
ing which concludes in the knowledge of a concrete and individual tact. Since 
this is hie express purpose, and since he states nothing about the completeness 
of his reasoning theory, it is reasonable to accept Newman's theory as applic-
able only in concrete reasoning. That Newman did not consider his reasoning 
theory in the Grammar to be complete is also indicated by hi. reference to the 
Grammar as a "conversational essay" and a dpreliminary opening ot the ground. d22 
The limitation of the purpose of Newman's reasoning theory aleo offers an ex-
planation for hie devaluating of formal inference and his stres. upon informal 
inference. 3ince formal inference cannot aocount for our certitude about con-
crete and individual conclusione,whereas informal can, it ie entirely consis-
tent with Nswman'e purpose that he show how formal inference is inadequate in 
regard to the concrete and individual, and not develop the value of formal in-
ference in science and philosophy. 
22 Letter to Father Nsltord, in Ward, ~, II, 266. 
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Newman has given important insights into the nature of reasoning on 
concrete matter. He has shown the inability of logic in questions about 
the singular as singular, and has offered a method by which such conclusions 
can be reached; in this method is included an important inaight, that the 
convergence of arguments toward a concrete conolusion, so as to irdicate that 
the conolusion must be true, can be judged by the mind even though a verbal 
demonstration of the conclusion cannot be given; the mind is ~ore vigorous 
than anyone of its work"such as language. Newman has described factI about 
implicitness in reasoning that must be considered in a philosophy or man and 
hie operations. He has shown throughout the reasoning process the importance 
of the person and personal qualities, such a. prudence, sens. of duty, and 
familiarity wi:h a particular subjec,-matter. As a whole, Newman's theory of 
reasoning in the Grammar £! Aasent is • valuable contribution to philosophy. 
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